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I. Introduction
A frequently discussed tax reform suggestion of the last decade
is the integration of the federal income taxes imposed on corpora-
tions and shareholders.' Although various methods of achieving in-
tegration have been advanced, the common goal of the advocates of
integration is to eliminate, either wholly or in part, the double taxa-
tion of corporate earnings.2 Under present law, corporate income is
taxed when earned by the corporation and again when distributed as
a dividend to the shareholders.' This double taxation presumably
impedes capital formation.4 In light of recent economic trends in the
United States,5 double taxation has come under attack by many
commentators.6
Despite the attention given to the impact of integration at the
federal level, very few commentators have focused on the effect of
integration on state income taxation of corporations and individu-
1. See C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? (Brookings, Wash.
D.C. 1979); Break, Integration of the Corporation and Personal Income Taxes, 22 NAT'L TAX J.
39 (1969); Break & Pechman, Reflections on "Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income
Taxes: Relationship Between the Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J.
341 (1975); Byrne & Sato, The Domestic Consequences of Alternative Systems ofCorporate Tax-
ation, 4 PuB. FINANCE Q. 259 (1976); Comm'n on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y.
St. Bar A., Report on tke Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, 31 TAX LAW.
37 (1977); Cox, Corporate Income Tax and Integration: A Summary ofPositions and the Pros-
pectsfor Change, 58 TAXES 10 (1980); Feldstein & Frisch, Corporate Tax Integration: The
Estimated Effects on Capital Accumulation and Tax Distribution of Two Integration Proposals,
30 NAT'L TAX J. 37 (1977); Gabinet & Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of
Incomefor Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. L. REV. 895 (1977);
Galvin, The Substantive Tax Reform Project: Preliminary Finiings on the Corporate Tax, 22
Sw. L.J. 717 (1968); Holland, Reflections on "Integration" ofCorporate and Individual Income
Taxes. Some Observations on Full Integration, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 353 (1975); McLure, Integra-
tion fthe Income Taxes: Why and How, 2 J. CORP. TAX. 429 (1976); McLure, Integration of
Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,
88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975); McLure, The Taxation ofIncomefrom Corporate Shareholding-
The Casefor Integrating the Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 257 (1975); McLure & Surrey,
Integration of Income Taxes. Issuesfor Debate, 55 HARV. Bus. REv. 169 (1977); Surrey, Re-
flections on "Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 335
(1975). Income tax integration is not an idea of the last decade. See, e.g., NAT'L TAX A.,
PROC. OF FORTIETH ANN. CONT. 134-89 (1947); Devine, Taxing Corporations as Partnershps,
26 TAXES 506 (1948); Westfall, Integrating Federal Income Taxes on Corporations and Their
Shareholders, 27 TAXES 236 (1949).
2. See, e.g., C. MCLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?, supra note 1;
Holland, supra note 1; McLure, Integration afthe Income Taxes. Why and How, supra note 1;
McLure, Integration ofPersonal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent
Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 1.
3. I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(6). Double taxation presently is offset by the $100 dividend exclu-
sion for individuals and 85% deduction for dividends received by corporations. Id §§ 116,
243-47. The earnings of certain corporations presently are taxed only once. See notes 90-132
and accompanying text infra
4. See, e.g., Harris, Tax Equity and the Needfor Capital With Special Reference to
Income from Corporate Shareholding 28 NAT'L TAX J. 292 (1975); Hickman, Tax Equity and
the Needfor Capital, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 282, 287-88 (1975).
5. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON TAX POL-
ICY AND CAPITAL FORMATION 3-4 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION].
6. See note 2 supra,
als.7 Most states have not conducted major studies of the topic. 8
This article concentrates on the effect of integration at the state
level.9
Federal income tax integration has found recent support in
Congress' and in the Reagan administration." Although it is diffi-
cult to predict whether integration will become a reality in the near
future,12 an analysis of the effect of integration on state income taxa-
tion provides additional factors that should be considered when inte-
gration is given serious attention by Congress and the public. 3
It is not certain when consideration of the effect of federal inte-
gration on state income taxation will move into the foreground, but a
related proposal deserves attention at the present time. The Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is studying a
proposal to extend the small business corporation provisions of Sub-
chapter S of the Internal Revenue Code' 4 to all corporations that are
privately owned.' 5 This proposal, which in effect is similar to full
integration,' 6 would increase the number of Subchapter S corpora-
tions to the extent that states would need to reexamine their present
treatment of Subchapter S corporations. 7 The portions of this arti-
cle that discuss full integration are pertinent to determining the ef-
7. Clarke, The Taxation ofIncomefram Corporate Shareholding.: State and Local View,
28 NAT'L TAX J. 373 (1975); Comm'n on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar
A., supra note 1, at 62-63; McKessy, Corporate and Individual Tax Reform Consideredfrom a
State and Local Viewpoint, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 377 (1975).
8. New York is a notable exception. Its Department of Taxation and Finance has un-
dertaken a thorough study of the effect of income tax integration on New York. Letter from
James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of New York, to James E.
Maule (January 11, 1978) (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
9. Professor Charles McLure, the leading authority and author of numerous articles and
the only book on the topic of income tax integration, told the author of this article in 1978 that
neither he nor anyone he knew was studying the effects of federal income tax integration on
state income tax systems. The absence of any recent publications on the subject has confirmed
Professor McLure's observation.
10. See, e.g., H.R. 897, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Rep. Beard); H.R. 306, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) (Rep. Hansen); H.R. 4833, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Rep. Sawyer); 124
CONG. REC. H 640-42 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
11. See, e.g., [1981] FED. TAXES (P-H) 60-165, 60-167 (Feb. 11, 1981) (remarks of Nor-
man B. Ture, Undersecretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
12. See Cox, supra note 1, for a brief analysis of the political atmosphere in which deci-
sions about federal income tax integration must be made.
13. The states anticipate that Congress will consider the effect of integration on their
income tax systems when it considers integration at the federal level. See Clarke, supra note 7,
at 376; McKessy, supra note 7, at 381.
14. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
15. See 145 J. Accountancy, Jan. 1978, at 3. A similar study has been conducted by the
Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy. See 144 J. Accountancy, Oct. 1977, at 24.
The request for expansion and reform of Subchapter S also has been made in the commentary.
See Peckron, Subchapter S Shareholder Requirement. Needfor a Change, 55 TAXES 92, 95-96
(1977). Most, if not all, of the proponents of Subchapter S reform seek an increase in its use;
accordingly, comments in this section about the AICPA proposal apply to all Subchapter S
proposals.
16. Full integration is outlined in notes 21-25 and accompanying text infra.
17. Generally, states are divided on their recognition of elections by shareholders of Sub-
chapter S corporations. See notes 90-99, 521-31 and accompanying text infra
fects of the AICPA proposal on states,' 8 since the two proposals
differ only in technical aspects 19 and quantitative impact.2 °
This article discusses several major methods of integration, his-
torical aspects of integration, and some provisions in existing federal
and foreign tax law that are analogous to integration. The article
then analyzes the effects of integration on the states and the possible
state responses to the various methods of integration. The analysis
considers the state both as a separate entity and as a member of the
federal union and examines devices to preserve state income tax rev-
enues that might otherwise be reduced by the adoption of integration
at the federal level.
II. Preliminary Explanations
A. Major Methods of Integration
1. Full Integration.- The basic premise of the full integration
method is that the shareholders of a corporation include their pro-
portionate shares2' of the net income22 of the corporation in gross
18. For the purpose of simplicity, the remainder of this article does not specifically ad-
dress the AICPA or similar proposals. Nevertheless, comments made with regard to the full
integration proposal should be useful in determining the effects of the AICPA or similar Sub-
chapter S revision proposals on state income taxation.
19. The differences between Subchapter S provisions and the full integration proposal
are of such relatively minor importance that the analysis of one proposal is quite relevant to
examination of the other proposal. For example, Subchapter S Corporations are taxed on
certain capital gains, I.R.C. § 1378, whereas under full integration these gains are subject to
tax at the shareholder level.
20. Full integration would affect all corporations; the AICPA or similar proposals would
affect only privately owned corporations.
21. For the purpose of simplicity, this article assumes that owners of common stock
would be taxed on amounts of corporate net income in proportion to their voting interests in
the corporation. Income tax integration at the federal level raises the issue of how to treat
owners of preferred stock and hybrid securities. See McLure, Integration ofPersonal and Cor-
porate Income Taxes- The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 1, at
563-64, 588. Although the resolution of these issues affects the identity of the shareholders
who are taxed and changes the distribution of the corporate net income, the concepts devel-
oped in this article are not significantly affected by the resolution of those issues. Although in
certain circumstances one resolution of those issues might have the effect of attributing more of
the distributive net income to nonresident shareholders than would another resolution, these
differences are ignored in this article because the differences are relatively insignificant, and
because this article assumes that any state that adopts integration will conform to the Federal
resolutions of these issues.
Another group of issues at the federal level concerns the treatment of part-year sharehold-
ers and shareholders who during the year change the amount of their holdings of stock in the
corporation. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TAx REFORM 71-73
(1977) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS]. Although there are various methods of resolving
these problems, this article assumes unchanging full year ownership of stock by shareholders
in corporations.
22. Under the full integration method, there are unresolved questions concerning the
manner in which corporate income is included by shareholders in gross income. One option is
to treat the shareholders as shareholders in Subchapter S corporations are treated. See I.R.C.
§§ 1371-1379. Another option is to treat the corporation as a conduit in much the same man-
ner as a partnership. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 68. See generally Cohen, Problems
Involved in Alternative Proposals/or Integration or Reduction in IS. Tax. Possible Solutions to
Practical Problems, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 359-60 (1975); McLure, Integration of Personal and Cor-
income.23 Under the full integration method, it is immaterial
whether the net income of the corporation is actually distributed to
the shareholders.
One variation of the full integration method embellishes the ba-
sic proposal with a provision for withholding. The corporation is
required to withhold and remit to the government a certain portion
of its net income.24 The shareholders of the corporation claim their
proportionate shares of the tax withheld by the corporation as a
credit against their income tax liabilities. 25
2. Dividend Credit.-Under the dividend credit method,
shareholders receiving dividends from a corporation claim as a
credit against their income tax liabilities their proportionate shares
of the income tax paid by the corporation on the corporate net in-
come 26 out of which the dividends are paid.27 An essential feature of
the dividend credit method is the retention of the corporate income
tax. A second feature is that shareholders include the credit in gross
income.28
There are numerous variations of the dividend credit method of
porate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 1, at
563. This article assumes that any state that adopts integration will conform to the federal
treatment of the corporate net income, with minor deviations to account for the state income
exemption of interest on federal indebtedness and similar items.
23. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 68-75; Byrne & Sato, supra note 1, at 260, Comm. on
Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 38; STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 13; McKessy, supra note 7, at 378. Shareholders that
are corporations presumably would pay no income tax, but their shares of the corporate net
income would be included in their own net incomes and in the gross incomes of their
shareholders.
24. Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 38.
Payment of this portion of the corporate net income to the government does not reduce the
amount included in the gross incomes of the shareholders. It is designed as a device to allevi-
ate liquidity problems of the shareholders. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 73.
25. See note 23 supra, Taxes withheld with respect to a shareholder that is a corporation
presumably are claimed as credits by the shareholders of that corporation.
26. See note 22 supra. Several complicated issues must be resolved before the dividend
credit method of integration is adopted at the federal level. For example, the credit might be
denied for dividends distributed from tax-exempt income. This approach requires tracing the
corporate income, an approach not necessarily preferred by the architects of the dividend
credit method of integration. See Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Expe-
rience, 31 TAX LAW. 65, 95-96 (1977). Another approach, for example, is to require the corpo-
ration to pay tax on all income distributed as dividends. Id at 95.
27. Byrne & Sato, supra note 1, at 260; Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the
N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 37-38; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at
11; McKessy, supra note 7, at 379. The section 116 individual dividend exclusion and section
243 corporate dividends received deduction probably would be repealed.
28. An example of this "gross-up" is as follows. Assume that .4 is a 5% shareholder of
Corporation X. In 1979, X has taxable income of $10,000 and pays corporate income tax of
$4,800 (A 48% corporate rate is assumed for purposes of simplicity). X distributes a $200
dividend to A. A must include $385 in gross income-$200 dividend plus $185, the income tax
paid by the corporation with respect to the $385 out of which it paid the $200. After comput-
ing his income tax liability, A claims a $185 credit. Cf. I.R.C. § 78, which requires a similar
gross-up by corporations that claim the deemed-paid foreign tax credit under sections 902 or
960.
integration. The credit allowed to the shareholder can vary from 100
percent of the tax paid by the corporation to as little as a fraction of
a percent of the tax.29
3. Dividend Deduction.-Another method of achieving inte-
gration is to allow corporations a deduction for dividends paid.30
This method has no effect on the computation of taxable income by
shareholders, although it might include repeal of the dividend exclu-
sion for individuals3' and the dividends received deduction for
shareholders that are corporations.32
4. Dividend Exclusion.-Integration can also be accomplished
by permitting shareholders to exclude dividends from gross in-
come.33 This method has a minimal effect on corporations that are
shareholders because these corporations presently deduct most divi-
dends from gross income. 34 There is no effect on the corporate in-
come tax.
35
5. Split Corporate Tax Rates.-The basic premise of the split-
rate method of integration is that the corporation pays tax on taxable
income that is distributed as dividends at a lower rate than on taxa-
ble income that is retained.36 Countless pairs of split-rates can be
adopted, 37 but the important feature of this method is that the basic
structures of both corporate38 and individual income tax remain
unchanged.
6. Repeal of Corporate Income Tax.-The final method of in-
tegration examined by this article is the repeal of the corporate in-
come tax.39 Shareholders that are not corporations would continue
to include dividends in gross income.'
29. The concepts used in this analysis will not be affected by a change in the credit rate.
30. Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 38;
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 14; McKessy, supra note 7, at 380.
31. I.R.C. § 116.
32. Id §§ 243-247.
33. McKessy, supra note 7, at 379.
34. See note 3 supra
35. To be more precise, there is a slight effect on the corporate income tax because the
85% dividends received deduction under section 243 is converted into a 100% dividend
exclusion.
36. Byrne & Sato, supra note 1, at 260; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note
5, at 17.
37. Technically, the dividend deduction method of integration is any form of the split-
rate method under which the tax rate on distributed taxable income is zero.
38. The 85% dividends received deduction for corporations under sections 243-247 might
be repealed.
39. McKessy, supra note 7, at 379.
40. The $100 dividend exclusion for individuals under section 116 might be repealed.
B. Historical Highlights
1. The Split-Rate Experiment of 1936-38.-Corporate and in-
dividual income taxes were integrated during only one brief period
in the history of the federal income tax. In 1936, Congress imposed
a surtax on corporate taxable income that was not distributed as div-
idends.4" Taxable income distributed as dividends was taxed at the
normal corporate income tax rates. 42 This split-rate method of inte-
gration differs from the one previously described because the surtax
rates of 1936 varied according to the percentage of taxable income
distributed as dividends.43
During this period of integration, corporate dividend distribu-
tions increased substantially.' At the same time, many corporations
increased their tax deductible expenditures to avoid the surtax on
undistributed taxable income without increasing dividend distribu-
tions.45 In 1938, Congress repealed the surtax on undistributed taxa-
ble income.'
The effect of split-rate integration on the states during this pe-
riod is inconclusive. Meaningful statistics are scarce47 and, in addi-
tion, both corporate and individual state income taxes were less
significant than they are today.4s Nevertheless, two principal effects
on the state income taxes were notable. First, the increase in divi-
dend distributions increased the income tax bases of the states that
had individual income taxes.49 Second, the increase in corporate ex-
penditures50 reduced the taxable incomes of corporations subject to
state income taxation. 5'
41. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 14, 40 Stat. 1648.
42. Id § 13.
43. Id § 14.
44. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 17.
45. For example, employee compensation and maintenance expenses. Id
46. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 27, 52 Stat. 447.
47. The best statistics available are not sufficiently detailed to permit precise analysis.
48. In 1936, state income tax revenues from corporations were $113 million. Revenues
from individuals were $153 million. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1789-1945, at 317 (1949). In 1978, these amounts were $10.7 billion and
$29.1 billion, respectively. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 292 (101st ed. 1980). Between 1969 and 1979 state tax revenues increased 160%. Reve-
nues from corporate income tax increased 225%. U.S. BuR.Au OF CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL
FINANCES in 1978-79, Table 4 (1980); U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES
in 1969-70, Table 4 (1971). It should be noted that fiscal year 1980 was the eighth consecutive
year in which state corporate and individual income tax revenues generated more tax revenue
($50.4 billion) than any other single source. 42 STATE TAX REV. (CCH), No. 10 (March 10,
1981).
49. This occurred whether or not the individual income tax system of the state con-
formed to the federal system, unless the state excluded dividends from income taxation.
50. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
51. There may have been secondary effects. For example, the corporate executive who
received higher compensation and the business firm that performed maintenance services for
the corporation had an increase in income, which in many cases was subject to state income
taxation. The principal effects probably offset each other to a great extent.
2 The Massachusetts Property Tax.-Little history of corpo-
rate-shareholder integration in the United States exists, but the expe-
rience of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with integrated
property taxes between 1813 and 1920 offers some interesting in-
sights into the problem. Predictions based on the Massachusetts ex-
perience are limited, however, to the possible effects of an integrated
system of taxation on state tax administration. Study of the Massa-
chusetts experience is not helpful in determining other possible ef-
fects of the various methods of integration on the states.-
2
From the earliest days of its history as a colony and a state,
Massachusetts imposed a faculties tax on individuals and corpora-
tions.5 3 Each individual and corporation was required to submit a
general schedule of property that was owned. The schedule included
earned and unearned income derived from that property.5 4 Since
undistributed income of a corporation is reflected in the value of its
net assets,55 the corporation in effect paid a property tax on undis-
tributed income because it paid a property tax on its net assets. At
the same time, individual shareholders paid property taxes on the
value of stock they owned in the corporation. The value of the stock
also reflected the net asset value of the corporation. 6 Under this
property tax structure, the undistributed income of the corporation
was taxed twice.57
The Massachusetts system of taxation was changed in 1813. In
a case challenging the double taxation of undistributed income, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a corporation was
required to include only real estate in its general schedule of prop-
erty.58 This decision had a significant effect on Massachusetts reve-
52. There are issues concerning revenue effects, state legislative decisions to adopt or
reject integration, interrelationships among the states, and constitutional problems. For an
explanation of why the double taxation eliminated by the integrated property tax differs from
the double taxation of corporate income distributed as dividends, see note 57 and accompany-
ing text infra.
53. Clarke, supra note 7, at 374.
54. Id
55. As a general rule, if a corporation earns income that is not distributed, it either
reduces liabilities or increases assets. If it reduces liabilities, its net asset value (assets less
liabilities) increases. See J. WESTON & E. B iuH.AM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 89-92 (3d ed.
1969).
56. The stock of a corporation generally increases in value as its net asset value increases.
See id at 419-30.
57. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 374. The effect of the property tax can be more clearly
understood if it is assumed that the corporation distributes all its income. Because the net
assets of the corporation do not increase, it pays no property tax on the income. The property
of the shareholders who receive the dividends increases, assuming that it is not spent on dis-
posable consumer goods. However, the increase in the value of their corporate stock that
would occur if the corporate income were not distributed does not occur. The property of the
shareholders, and their property tax liabilities, are, as a general proposition, the same as they
would be if the corporate income were not distributed. This double taxation differs from that
sought to be eliminated under the various income tax integration proposals because it is
double taxation of undistributed corporate income rather than of distributed corporate income.
58. Salem Iron Co. v. Danvers, 10 Mass. 514 (1813).
nues and its enforcement of the property tax. Shareholders failed to
disclose stock ownership,59 and the stock of nonresident shareholders
of Massachusetts corporations was not taxed since the property tax
was imposed only on property in Massachusetts.6' Finally, since the
tax was imposed at the local level, manufacturing towns that were
required to provide municipal services to corporations were in a less
advantageous position than residential towns with smaller municipal
burdens.6'
In 1863, Massachusetts replaced the local property tax system
with a corporate property tax that was administered and collected by
the state.62 Finally, in 1916, Massachusetts closed an era in its tax
history by enacting a general individual income tax to replace the
state property tax system.63 This article will examine the experience
of the Massachusetts tax administrators during this era to determine
its significance for recent income tax integration proposals.
C Current State Treatment of Analogous Situations.
L Partnershios.- State taxation of partnerships and their part-
ners is especially useful for analyzing the effects of full integration
on state income taxation of corporations and their shareholders. The
residency of the partner as well as the place where the partnership
does business determines the income tax treatment of partners by a
particular state. To avoid generalizations that hamper proper analy-
sis, the tax systems of five states will be discussed.
In Illinois, any resident who is a partner in a partnership, re-
gardless of where it does business, must include his distributive share
of the net income of the partnership" in taxable income.6 If the
resident partner is taxed by another state on all or a portion of his
distributive share of the net income of the partnership, the partner
can claim a credit for income taxes paid to that state.66
A person who is a nonresident of Illinois and a partner in a
59. Clarke, supra note 7, at 375.
60. Id at 374.
61. Id at 374-75.
62. Id at 375.
63. 1916 Mass. Acts ch. 289. For an explanation of the reasons for changing to a general
income tax, see generally Williamson, Tax Legirlation During 1916, PROc. OF TENTH ANN.
CONF. OF NAT'L TAX A. 386, 394-96 (1917). The corporate franchise tax measured by net
income was revised in 1919. 1919 Mass. Acts ch. 355.
64. The net income of the partnership is determined as it is for federal income tax pur-
poses. Illinois Income Tax Act § 205(b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-205(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981-82).
65. Illinois residents compute Illinois taxable income by making certain modifications to
their federal adjusted gross incomes. Id §§ 203(a)(1), 301. Technically, the distributive share
of partnership net income is included in Illinois taxable income because it is included in Illi-
nois base income, a step in the computation. See id
66. The credit is claimed in accordance with the usual requirements for claiming a credit.
These requirements include adequate proof of payment of taxes to the other state, inclusion of
the income in Illinois taxable income, and foregoing any deduction for the taxes claimed as a
partnership that earns any income in Illinois must take several steps
to determine the amount of income subject to taxation by Illinois.
Nonbusiness income of the partnership is allocated to each partner
in proportion to his distributive share of the net income of the part-
nership.67 Each partner treats the allocated portion as if it were
earned in his separate capacity as an individual.68 Thus, for exam-
ple, the Illinois taxable income of a nonresident partner includes
capital gains from the sale or exchange of real proterty located in
Illinois, capital gains from the sale or exchange of personal property
having its situs in Illinois, capital gains from the sale or exchange of
personal property having its situs in a state that does not tax the gain
if the commercial domicile of the partner is in Illinois, and rents
from real property located in Illinois. 69 Business income of the part-
nership is allocated at the partnership level.70 If the partnership de-
rives its business income solely from Illinois, the entire business
income is allocated to Illinois.7 Otherwise, business income is allo-
cated pursuant to a conventional three-factor formula that measures
property, payroll, and sales.72 The business income attributable to
Illinois is then allocated to each partner in proportion to his distribu-
tive share of the net income of the partnership.
7 3
New York taxes resident partners in virtually the same manner
as Illinois taxes resident partners. 4 The New York adjusted gross
income75 of nonresident partners includes the portion of their dis-
tributive shares of partnership income that is derived from or con-
nected with New York sources.76 Partnerships doing business in
New York77 are subject to the unincorporated business tax,78 which
is based on federal adjusted gross income.79
Ohio taxes partners in virtually the same manner as Illinois
credit. See Illinois Dep't of Revenue, Instructions to the 1976 Illinois Income Tax Form IL-
1040, at 6.
67. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 3-305(b) (Smith-Hurd 1981-82).
68. Id
69. Id § 303, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 3-303 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82).
70. Id § 305(a).
71. Id §304(a).
72. Id
73. Id § 305(a).
74. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, §§ 601(b), 617, 620(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80).
75. New York adjusted gross income is based on federal adjusted gross income and is the
amount from which New York taxable income is computed. Id § 63 1.
76. Id § 637. The New York treatment of nonresident partners differs from that in Illi-
nois only in the mechanics of allocation and apportionment.
77. Certain other entities, but not corporations, also are subject to the unincorporated
business tax. Id § 701(a).
78. The purpose of the unincorporated business tax is to prevent businesses from avoid-
ing the corporate income tax by doing business in an unincorporated form. See Moffett v.
Bates, 276 App. Div. 38, a,'d without opinion, 301 N.Y. 597 (1949).
79. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 705(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80).
taxes partners.8 0 Ohio, however, permits a partnership to file a single
return on behalf of, and pay the individual income tax liabilities of,
its nonresident partners if those partners derive no taxable income
from Ohio other than their distributive shares of the partnership's
net income allocable to Ohio.8 '
In Pennsylvania, residents who are partners in any partnership
include in their taxable income their distributive shares of each class
of income,82 but not classes of loss, 83 received by the partnership.84
If all or a portion of the partnership income is subject to income
taxation by another state, the partner can claim a credit for the
amount of income tax paid to the other state on income included by
the partner in taxable income.85 Nonresident partners of a partner-
ship that derives all its income from sources within Pennsylvania are
subject to taxation by Pennsylvania on their entire distributive shares
of the net income of the partnership.86 Otherwise, the nonresident
partner is taxed on that portion of the distributive share derived
from sources within Pennsylvania plus the Pennsylvania share of in-
come derived from sources not accurately ascertainable.87
Although there is no individual income tax in Florida, 88 corpo-
rations that are partners include their distributive shares of partner-
ship net income in their Florida taxable income in much the same
manner as is done in Ohio and Illinois.89
2 Electing Small Business Corporations.- State income taxa-
tion of electing small business corporations9" under Subchapter S of
the Internal Revenue Code (Subchapter S corporations) illustrates
the divergent state legislative reactions to integration of corporation
and shareholder9' taxation at the federal level. For federal income
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5747.01(A), 5747.05(A), 5747.05(B), 5747.20, 5747.21,
5747.22 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1980).
81. Id § 5747.08(D).
82. The classes of income are compensation, net profits from business, net gains from
disposition of property, rents and royalties, dividends, interest, gambling winnings, and net
gains or income from estates or trusts. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303 (Purdon Supp. 1981-
82).
83. Losses are taken into account only to the extent they reduce gains in the same class of
income. Net losses in one class of income cannot reduce gains in another class. Id
84. Id § 7306.
85. Id § 7314.
86. Id § 7308.
87. Id § 7310. The results under the Pennsylvania income tax system are not unlike
those reached under Ohio and Illinois law, except for the nonrecognition of certain losses as
explained in note 83 supra.
88. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
89. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 220.02(1), 220.12(1) (West Supp. 1981).
90. See I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
91. The federal tax treatment of Subchapter S corporations is not precisely full integra-
tion. See note 19 supra For examples of variations of state legislative reaction to the enact-
ment of Subchapter S in addition to those described in this chapter, see notes 521-31 and
accompanying text infra
tax purposes, the shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation, not the
corporation, are generally taxable on the net income of the
corporation.
92
In New York,93 Ohio,9 4 and Pennsylvania,95 Subchapter S cor-
porations are subject to taxation as any other corporations. New
York, however, requires resident shareholders of Subchapter S cor-
porations to include their shares of undistributed corporate income
in gross income. 96 Nonresidents are not required to do so. 97
Illinois does not tax Subchapter S corporations.98 Florida taxes
only that portion of Subchapter S corporate income that is subject to
federal income tax. 99
3. Cooperatives.- State income tax treatment of the coopera-
tive also deserves attention."°° For federal income tax purposes, co-
operatives are permitted to deduct amounts paid as capital stock
dividends.'1 l This treatment of cooperatives is almost identical to
the dividend deduction method of integration. 102
Florida and Illinois specifically permit cooperatives to deduct
dividends paid to the same extent that the dividends may be de-
ducted for federal income tax purposes. 0 3 No specific provisions ex-
ist in the tax laws of New York, Ohio, or Pennsylvania dealing with
cooperative dividend deductions, but the deduction is presumably
allowed because those states define taxable income as federal taxable
income and include no modifications of the dividend deductions by
cooperatives. "o
4. Domestic International Sales Corporations.- State income
tax treatment of domestic international sales corporations (DISC)
0 5
demonstrates the reactions of states to partial integration at the fed-
92. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
93. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9) (McKinney 1966); Ruling of State Tax Commission,
November 17, 1958, 1 N.Y. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) $ 5-101.375.
94. OrIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.01(C) (Page 1973).
95. Letter from Department of Revenue, 106 Pitts. L.J. 52 (1958), 139 Legal Intelligencer
119 (1958), I PA. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 10-101.70.
96. Opinion of Counsel, November 17, 1967, 1 N.Y. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 1 5-
101.375.
97. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 632(b)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
98. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-205(c) (Smith-Hurd 1974).
99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13(2)(i) (West Supp. 1980).
100. I.R.C. § 1381.
101. Id § 1382(c)(1).
102. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra. However, patronage dividends are not
deductible. I.R.C. § 1382(b).
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13(2)(g) (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-
203(d)(2)(F) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
104. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1981); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 5733.04(1) (Page 1973); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7401(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
105. A DISC is defined in I.R.C. § 992(a) as, in effect, a domestic corporation whose re-
ceipts and assets are substantially related to export activities.
eral level. A DISC is not subject to federal income tax.I°6 Instead, a
portion of its net income, whether or not distributed, is included in
the income of its shareholders.0 7 The remainder of the net income
is effectively untaxed. 10 8 For this reason, the federal income tax
treatment of a DISC is not full integration. Nevertheless, taxation of
DISCs sufficiently resembles full integration and is therefore rele-
vant for analysis.
In Pennsylvania, a DISC is taxed in the same manner as other
corporations."°9 A DISC shareholder who is an individual and a res-
ident of Pennsylvania is required to include in gross income all divi-
dends actually received from the DISC." 0  The nonresident
individual shareholder of a DISC is not subject to Pennsylvania tax-
ation on dividends actually received from the DISC."' A share-
holder of a DISC that is a corporation subject to tax by Pennsylvania
includes its share of the net income of the DISC in Pennsylvania
gross income." 2 The corporation, however, is permitted to deduct
"dividends received from any other corporation but only to the ex-
tent that such dividends are included in [federal] taxable income." II
Presumably, although dividends deemed distributed to a shareholder
of a DISC for federal income tax purposes are not "received" by the
shareholder, the corporate shareholder of the DISC is permitted to
deduct its share of DISC income included in federal and, thus, Penn-
sylvania income.
In Ohio, the DISC is also subject to taxation in the same man-
ner as other corporations." 4 The shareholder of the DISC includes
in Ohio taxable income that portion of the DISC's federal taxable
income allocable to Ohio, based on the assets of the DISC situate in
Ohio and elsewhere.' 15
In Florida,"16 Illinois,' and New York,' the DISC is exempt
106. I.R.C. § 991.
107. Id § 995. The calculation of the portion of the net income of the DISC that is in-
cluded in the gross income of its shareholders is very complicated, but as a general rule it can
be as little as one-half, or as great as all of the net income of the DISC.
108. Id The income that is not taxed may be taxed in the future when and if the share-
holder disposes of stock in the DISC, or when and if the DISC terminates existence as a DISC
or is disqualified as a DISC. Id § 995(b)(2), (c).
109. Letter from Director, Bureau of Corporation Taxes, to Commerce Clearing House,
Inc. (May 30, 1972), 1 PA. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 10-101.10.
110. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
111. Id §§ 7302(b), 7308. See Pa. Dep't of Revenue, 1977 Pennsylvania Individual In-
come Tax Forms and Instructions at 11.
112. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7401(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
113. Id See note 127 and accompanying text infra for the interpretation given to this
language with respect to Subpart F income. The same reasoning should apply by analogy to
deemed dividends from a DISC.
114. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5733.01(D) (Page 1973).
115. Tax Commissioner's Special Instruction No. 12 (September 5, 1972), 1 OHIO STATE
TAX REP. (CCH) 110-305.30.
116. Since Florida taxable income is based on federal taxable income, a DISC has no
Florida taxable income. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220,12(1) (West Supp. 1981).
117. Illinois taxable income also is based on federal taxable income. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
120, § 2-203(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
118. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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from taxation. In Florida, individual shareholders of a DISC are not
subject to income tax."19 Individual shareholders in Illinois and
New York and corporate shareholders in all three states are taxed on
the properly allocable portion of the DISC's federal taxable in-
come. 20 In New York, any corporation subject to New York taxa-
tion that is a shareholder in a DISC must file a consolidated income
tax return with the DISC.
12 1
5. Controlled Foreign Corporations. -For purposes of analyz-
ing state legislative reaction to federal income tax provisions resem-
bling integration, controlled foreign corporations (CFC) 22  are
treated similar to DISCs for federal income tax purposes. 23 Gener-
ally, shareholders 24 include a portion of the net income of the CFC
in federal taxable income (Subpart F income); the remainder of the
net income is, in effect, deferred for tax purposes.
25
Florida and Ohio specifically exclude Subpart F income from
taxable income.' 26 In Pennsylvania, Subpart F income is excluded
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Emhart Corp. 127 Subpart F income is
included in Illinois and New York taxable income.' 28 Both states
provide, however, that foreign taxes on Subpart F income, which
shareholders of CFCs must include in federal taxable income if they
claim a foreign tax credit 129 for federal taxes, 130 are excluded from
taxable income. '3' The CFC itself is taxed by a state if it does busi-
ness in the state and derives income from that activity.'
32
119. See note 88 and accompanying text supra
120. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.12(1) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 2-
203(b)(1), 3-301 (Smith-Hurd 1974 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(8-A) (b) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1980).
121. N.Y. TAx LAW ch. 60, § 208(9)(i)(B) (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.Y. TAX REG. § 3-9-
.3(b), I N.Y. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 9-626.
122. Controlled foreign corporations are defined in I.R.C. § 957 as, in effect, a foreign
corporation of which more than 50% of its shareholders are United States persons.
123. I.R.C. §§ 951-964. In contrast to a DISC, the CFC, and not its shareholders, is sub-
ject to tax on any income from sources within the United States that is effectively connected
with trade or business in the United States. Id §§ 882, 952(b).
124. This does not include foreign shareholders not subject to taxation by the United
States. Id §§ 951(b), 957(d).
125. See id §§ 882, 951. See also note 108 supra; I.R.C. §§ 367, 1248.
126. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13(3)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5733.04(I)(2) (Page 1973).
127. 443 Pa. 397, 278 A.2d 916 (1971), appeal dismissed, cert denied, 404 U.S. 981 (1972).
See notes 109-13 and accompanying text supra.
128. See note 117 supra, The law in New York is similar to the law in Illinois on this
issue. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1980).
129. I.R.C. §§ 901, 902, 960.
130. Id § 78. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
131. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); N.Y. TAX LAW ch.
60, § 208(9)(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
132. Since the net income of a corporation, for purposes of the income tax laws of the five
states discussed in this section, is based on federal taxable income, the income from that busi-
6. Corporations Formed to A void Income Tax on Sharehold-
ers.-Certain federal income tax provisions remotely resemble inte-
gration because they require corporations, or shareholders under
certain conditions, to pay tax on certain undistributed taxable in-
come.'33 These provisions address the accumulated earnings tax,
34
personal holding companies,' 35 and foreign personal holding compa-
nies.' 36 The corporation is permitted to deduct dividends paid to
shareholders when it computes the amount on which the accumu-
lated earnings or personal holding company tax is imposed. ' 37 The
deduction for dividends paid is taken into account 138 in computing
the foreign personal holding company income required to be in-
cluded in the gross income of the shareholders.
139
The five state tax laws discussed in this section do not contain
provisions comparable to those in the federal tax law. I4I Because the
accumulated earnings tax and personal holding company tax are not
taxes on taxable income under section 11 of the Internal Revenue
Code,' 4 1 the amounts subject to those taxes are not included in the
taxable income of corporations, whether or not based on federal tax-
able income. In Pennsylvania, individuals do not include foreign
personal holding company income in gross income because no provi-
sion includes that income in one of the classes of income.1 42 Corpo-
rations in Pennsylvania can deduct the foreign personal holding
company income from taxable income 143 because that income is a
dividend to them. 44 The statutes of the other three states analyzed
in this section contain no provisions that exclude foreign personal
holding company income from the taxable income of individuals
based on federal taxable income. 
45
D. Analogous Foreign Situations
L Canada. -A proposed but unadopted method of integrating
corporate and individual income taxes in Canada provides insights
into the problems that might be raised by integration in the United
ness activity generally is subject to federal and, thus, state income tax only if it is effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. See I.R.C. § 882.
133. I.R.C. §§ 531-565.
134. Id §§ 531-537.
135. Id §§ 541-547.
136. Id §§ 551-558.
137. Id §§ 535(a), 545(a), 561-565.
138. To this extent, the foreign personal holding company provisions more closely resem-
ble integration than do the accumulated earnings and personal holding company provisions.
139. I.R.C. § 556(a).
140. See, e.g., I ILL. STATE TAx REP. (CCH) 11-701.
141. I.R.C. §§ 531, 541(a).
142. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
143. Id § 7401(3).
144. See I.R.C. § 551(b); notes 109-13 and accompanying text supra
145. See note 140 and accompanying text supra
States. The relationship between the provinces and the national gov-
ernment of Canada is similar to the relationship between the various
states and the federal government in the United States.
In 1966, the Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commis-
sion) proposed the integration of corporate and individual income
taxes.' 4 6 Under the proposal, the corporation pays tax on its in-
come 147 and shareholders include in income their share of the net
income of the corporation, whether or not distributed. 14  The tax
paid by the corporation on the share of the corporate income that is
included in the income of the shareholder is added to the income of
the shareholder. The shareholder then claims that tax as a credit. 1
49
The Ministry of Finance, which presented the proposal to the Parlia-
ment,150 supported the proposal only as applied to closely held cor-
porations. A modified proposal was reported favorably by the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Ec-
onomic Affairs. 5 ' The Parliament, however, did not adopt the pro-
posal' 52 because of the impact of integration on the Canadian
national economy.
15
One of the reasons that the Carter Commission integration pro-
posal was rejected concerns the anticipated impact of integration on
the provinces. 54 According to the Carter Commission, an integra-
tion program that lacked coordination between the federal govern-
ment and the provinces would be "unsatisfactory" and an
"administrative nightmare. '-5  Nonetheless, the Commission pro-
posed integration, and recommended only four methods to prevent
the problems that integration would pose to the provinces. First, the
Commission suggested that provinces not already participating
should permit the federal government to collect income taxes on be-
half of the provinces, 156 as the "piggyback" provisions of the Internal
146. Royal Commission on Taxation, 4 Report 7 (Ottawa 1966).
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id The proposal was a combination of full integration and a dividend credit method
of integration that can properly be labelled a distributive share credit method of integration.
150. E. Benson (Minister of Finance), Proposals for Tax Reform §§ 4.20, 4.34 (1969).
151. House of Commons Standing Comm. on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, 28th
Parl., 2d Sess., Report Respecting the White Paper on Tax Reform 42 (Comm. Print 1970).
152. See the discussion in Gourevitch, supra note 26, at 84-86.
153. Some of the reasons included a shift in the tax burden from the corporate income tax
to other taxes, the ignoring of the separate existence of corporations, and the creation of a rigid
federal tax system. See id at 85-86; Hammer, The Taxation of Income from Corporate Share-
holding- Review ofPresent Systems in Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the U.K, 28 NAT'L
TAX J. 315, 324-27 (1975).
154. See Standing Senate Comm. on Banking, Trade and Commerce, 28th Parl., 2d Sess.,
Report on the White Paper Proposals for Tax Reform Presented to the Senate of Canada 45
(Comm. Print 1970).
155. Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Report 197 (Ottawa 1966).
156. Id at 195.
Revenue Code'. permit the United States to collect individual in-
come taxes on behalf of qualifying states.' Second, the Commis-
sion recommended that the provinces forego taxing corporations.'59
Alternatively, it suggested that the federal government permit share-
holders to take a credit against their federal tax liabilities for both
the federal tax on the corporation and a standard rate of provincial
corporation tax.16° Finally, the Commission recommended a highly
technical harmonization of corporate and individual federal and
provincial income tax rates and a continuation of the federal allow-
ance for abatement of individual provincial income taxes.' 6 '
The Ministry of Finance modified in three respects the recom-
mendations of the Carter Commission concerning the impact of inte-
gration on the provinces. First, the Ministry proposed extensive
discussions on the matter between the federal government and the
provinces.' 62 Second, it stated that changes in the provincial tax law
would be required.' 63 Finally, it proposed the repeal of the federal
allowance for abatement of individual provincial income taxes.
t64
The Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade, and Commerce
reported that the provinces had "expressed their disagreement with
the introduction of" a "radical and complicated restructuring of the
tax system."' 65 The Committee stated that if several provinces re-
fused to harmonize their income tax systems with that of the federal
government, the result would be an "impenetrable jungle of tax law
that would defy rational application."'
' 66
2. West Germany.-West Germany is the only nation with an
integrated corporate and individual income tax and a federal rela-
tionship between the states and the national government. The struc-
157. I.R.C. §§ 6361-6365.
158. Both the United States and Canadian federal "piggyback" provisions require that the
state or provincial income tax conform substantially to the federal income tax. Id § 6361(a);
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, 1960-61 CAN. STAT. ch. 58; Federal-Provincial
Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing Act, 1976-77 CAN. STAT. ch. 10, § 7
(1977).
159. Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Report 195 (Ottawa 1966).
160. Id at 197. It should be pointed out that this suggestion may have been made in light
of the fact that only two provinces at that time had not agreed to piggyback collection of their
taxes by the federal government. Id at 190.
161. Id at 199.
162. E. Benson, supra note 150, at § 7.10.
163. Id §7.11.
164. Id § 7.12. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and
Economic Affairs merely stressed the importance of coordination between the federal govern-
ment and the provinces. House of Commons Standing Comm. on Finance, Trade and Eco-
nomics, supra note 151, at 45.
165. Standing Senate Comm. on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra note 154, at 45.
166. Id If this prediction is applicable to the United States, it casts a dark cloud on the
future of income tax integration. In subsequent sections, this article explores whether the fears
of the Senate of Canada have meaning for the United States.
ture of income taxation in West Germany, however, makes analogy
to the United States and its individual states difficult.
Prior to 1977, West Germany had a split-rate method of integra-
tion167 that taxed undistributed corporate net income at fifty-one
percent and distributed income at fifteen percent.' 61 Since 1976,
West Germany has had a combination split-rate and dividend credit
method of integration. Undistributed corporate income is taxed at
fifty-six percent and distributed income is taxed at thirty-six per-
cent. 16 9 Shareholders, however, are permitted to claim a credit for
the taxes paid by the corporation on the income distributed to
them. 170 The tax claimed as a credit must be included in the income
of the shareholder.
17 1
The states of West Germany have a unique relationship with
the federal government in the area of income taxation. The states do
not have separate legislative powers to tax, but share the proceeds of
the basic corporate' 72 and individual taxes 173 with the federal gov-
ernment and municipalities.
Determination of the respective shares of the federal, state, and
municipal governments requires the consent of the Council of
States.' 74 Special formulas allocate the share of the states among the
states, and equalization procedures take into account the different
financial strengths of the various states.' Because of this mecha-
nism, which resembles revenue-sharing, income tax integration has
not created any significant problems for the states of West Germany.
III. The State in Isolation: The Effect of Income Tax Integration
A. Introduction
Congressional integration of corporate and individual income
taxes will produce an immediate effect on the various states in the
absence of state legislative reaction. The extent of that immediate
effect depends on the method of integration adopted and the nature
of each particular state's system of taxation. 76 This section exam-
167. Hammer, supra note 153, at 317-18. For a description of the split-rate method of
integration, see notes 36-38 and accompanying text .pra




172. HARvD LAw SCHOOL, WORLD TAX SERnEs: TAXATION IN THE FEDEa. REPuB-
LIC OF GERmANY, ch. 1, § 3.2 (2d ed. H.J. Gumpel 1973).
173. There is a corporate income tax on undistributed net income. See note 169 and ac-
companying text spr-
174. HARVAID LAW SCHOOL, mpra note 172, at § 3.2.
175. Id
176. The nature of state taxing systems can be analyzed in terms of their conformity to the
federal income tax. Under this approach, states can be separated into the following six catego-
ries: (1) states with no income tax; (2) states with no individual income tax, but with a corpo-
ines various situations that might arise and develops an analysis of
the immediate effects on the states. 1'7 Two assumptions underlie the
analysis for each state: (1) the corporation is incorporated and does
all its business in that state 78 and (2) the shareholders of that corpo-
ration are residents 79 of that state.' 80
B. Full Integration
States that require corporations to compute state taxable income
by making adjustments to federal taxable income' 8' will be signifi-
rate income tax that confronts to the federal income tax; (3) states with an individual and
corporate income tax, neither of which conform to the federal income tax; (4) states with an
individual and corporate income tax, of which only the individual income tax conforms to the
federal income tax; (5) states with an individual and corporate income tax, of which only the
corporate income tax conforms to the federal income tax; and (6) states with an individual and
corporate income tax, both of which conform to the federal income tax.
This article focuses primarily on states in the second, fifth, and sixth categories. Of the
states in the first category, the adoption of income tax integration at the federal level will have
no effect other than to change income taxes that residents pay to other states from sources
within which they earn income. With respect to states in the third category, the effect is the
same as it is for states in the first category except that the state might review its decision not to
conform to the federal income tax. The analysis of the effect on states in the fourth category is
inversely analogous to the fifth category.
177. The next section discusses what reactions, if any, various state legislatures might take
in response to the enactment of income tax integration by the Congress. See notes 230-329 and
accompanying text infra. Subsequent sections embellish the analyses in this and the next sec-
tion by taking into account the federal relationship .among the states. See notes 330-502 and
accompanying tex infra.
178. The purpose of this assumption is to prevent the hypothetical corporation discussed
in this section from being subject to income taxation by any other state. This permits the
analysis to begin at a less complex stage than it does in the subsequent sections in which it is
assumed at times that the corporation is subject to taxation by more than one state. See notes
357-502 and accompanying text infra The term "resident" when used in this article with re-
spect to corporations means a corporation subject to income taxation by the state in which it is
a "resident."
179. States have different definitions of "resident." For example, Pennsylvania defines
resident as "an individual who is domiciled in [Pennsylvania] unless he maintains no perma-
nent place of abode in [Pennsylvania] and does maintain a permanent place of abode else-
where . . . or who is not domiciled in [Pennsylvania] but maintains a permanent place of
abode in [Pennsylvania]." 72 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7 301(p) (Purdon Supp. 1977). In con-
trast, Ohio defines resident as "[a]n individual who is domiciled in (Ohio and an] individual
who.. . maintains a permanent place of abode in [Ohio], and who does not maintain a per-
manent place of abode elsewhere." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.01(I)(1), (2) (Page Supp.
1975). The term "resident" when used in this article with respect to individuals includes the
various concepts associated with the definition but it is assumed that in no event is an individ-
ual a resident of more than one state. This permits initial analysis to begin at a more funda-
mental stage. See note 178 supra In subsequent sections, portions of the analysis assume that
an individual is subject to taxation by more than one state, as a resident of one state and a
nonresident of another.
180. More complex situations, in which the corporation, the shareholder, or both, are sub-
ject to taxation in more than one state, are analyzed in subsequent sections of this article. See
notes 330-502 and accompanying text infra
181. The corporate income tax systems of the five states whose income tax systems are
examined in this section conform to the federal income tax system. As of December 16, 1980,
thirty-five of the forty-six states with corporate income taxes did likewise. 41 STATE TAx RV.
(CCH) No. 51, at 4-5 (December 16, 1980). In a few of these states, however, the conformity is
with respect to the Internal Revenue Code as of a specific date. See, e.g., Wallace v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 184 N.W.2d 588 (1971) (Minnesota Constitution prohibits
federal amendments to Internal Revenue Code subsequent to date referentially adopted by
legislature from being applicable to Minnesota). This article assumes that state conformity to
cantly affected by adoption of full integration at the federal level.'82
Under full integration, federal taxable income of corporations is
zero.' 83 Accordingly, the state taxable income of the corporation is
zero unless the corporation has items of income excluded from its
federal gross income or has taken deductions on its federal return for
which there are adjustments required by the state tax law.184 For
example, a corporation must add municipal bond interest, state in-
come taxes paid or accrued, and one-half of net long-term capital
gain to federal taxable income. 85 These adjustments, however, not
only offset each other to some extent,' 86 but also constitute a rela-
tively minor fraction of state taxable income of corporations.'87
Consequently, states will experience a drastic decrease in corporate
income tax revenues.
188
Full integration at the federal level will have various effects on
state individual income taxation. In Pennsylvania, there will be no
effect'8 9 because individual taxable income is computed without re-
the federal income tax base is so structured that amendments to the federal tax law are auto-
matically adopted by the state.
182. The unincorporated business tax law in New York also is affected. See notes 78-79
and accompanying text supra
183. See notes 21-23 and accompanying textsupra. The corporation has a tax liability if it
is required to withhold taxes on behalf of the shareholders. This is the liability of a withhold-
ing agent, however, not income tax liability. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra
184. Most state corporate income tax laws contain at least several of these items. See note
185 and accompanying text infra.
185. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). The lan-
guage of the Illinois statute raises an interesting issue. The adjustments are required "to the
extent excluded [or deducted) from gross income in the computation of adjusted gross in-
come." Id Initially, it might be argued that the adjustments required by the statute do not
exist because under full integration corporations do not compute adjusted gross income or
gross income. It is more likely, however, that under full integration corporations will continue
to compute gross and taxable incomes, in order to compute the distributive shares of corporate
net income included in the gross income of the shareholders. The mechanics probably will not
be unlike the partnership provisions of Subchapter K of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 701-703.
186. There are subtraction adjustments as well as the addition adjustments, some of which
are listed in the text accompanying note 185 supra. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-
203(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
187. Complete and precise statistics are difficult to find, but it is possible to approximate
the situation. In 1977, the income of corporations subject to federal income tax was $212.5
billion. The amount of one important subtraction, interest from state and local obligations,
was only $8.3 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, I.R.S., PRELIMINARY STATISTICS OF
INCOME-1977 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, Pub. 159, at 3, 13 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as IRS 1977 CORPORATION INCOME TAX STATISTICS].
188. In 1979, the states raised $12.1 billion from corporate income tax revenues. Of that
amount, $8.3 billion was raised by states whose corporate income tax systems conformed to the
federal income tax system. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 305 (101st ed. 1980).
189. Pennsylvania requires individuals to include "dividends" in taxable income. 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1981). The term "dividends", however, should
not encompass undistributed taxable income of a corporation included in the federal gross
income of the shareholder because the term will continue to have independent significance.
This conclusion is based on analogy to the partnership provisions of Subchapter K of Chapter
I of the Internal Revenue Code, in which distributions are distinguished from distributive
shares. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 736(b)(1).
gard to federal taxable income.' A significant effect, however, will
occur in states whose individual income tax base conforms to the
federal income tax base.'9 1 Since there are no provisions in the tax
laws of these states permitting the shareholder to deduct undistrib-
uted taxable income of the corporation from taxable income for pur-
poses of computing state taxable income, revenues from individual
income taxes in those states will increase.'
92
The combined effect of full integration at the federal level on
corporate and individual income taxes of the state varies according
to the facts and circumstances of each case.' 93 In Florida, where
there is no individual income tax, the combined effect will be an
almost complete elimination of income tax revenues. ' 94 Similarly, in
Pennsylvania, where individual income tax revenues will be essen-
tially uneffected, corporate income tax revenues will be virtually
eliminated. 9 Whether the combined effect will produce an increase
or decrease in state income tax revenues in the other states-Illinois,
Ohio, and New York-depends on the interplay of three factors.
First, the actual effect is contingent upon whether the average corpo-
rate income tax rate is higher or lower than the average individual
income tax rate. 196 For example, in Illinois corporations pay tax at a
flat rate of four percent of taxable income and individuals pay tax at
a flat rate of two and one-half percent. 97 Second, the corporate divi-
dend rate 9 ' is of consequence because it affects the amount of cor-
190. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7302, 7303 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
191. The conformity can be a reference to federal taxable income, a reference to federal
adjusted gross income, or by reference to federal income tax liability. As of December 16,
1980, thirty-three of the forty-four states with individual income taxes had individual income
tax systems that conformed to the federal income tax system. 41 STATE TAX REV. (CCH) No.
51, at 6 (December 16, 1980). The analysis of this article generally is not affected by the
manner in which the state attains conformity to the federal income tax system. If in a particu-
lar case the manner of conformity is of significance, the author so indicates.
192. In 1979, the states raised $32.6 billion from individual income tax revenues. Of that
amount, $23.9 billion was raised by states whose individual income tax systems conformed to
the federal income tax system. U.S. BuRAu OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 305 (101st ed. 1980). In states that require income tax liability to be computed
as a percentage of federal income tax liability, the same result is reached because there is a
higher federal income tax liability on which to base state income tax liability.
193. These conclusions are based on an assumption that there are no interstate aspects to
each transaction. See notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra The complications raised by
considering these interstate aspects are discussed in subsequent sections of this article. See
notes 330-502 and accompanying text infra.
194. See notes 213-15 and accompanying text infra.
195. Unlike Florida, Pennsylvania will not lose virtually all its income tax revenues. It is
doubtful, however, whether that distinction would make the tax administrators of Penn-
sylvania less concerned than those of Florida.
196. The existence of progressive tax rate structures at the state level and the difficulty in
determining tax brackets of shareholders makes it extremely difficult to derive a more precise
estimate.
197. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(b) (Smith-Hurd 1974). The flat rates are required
by the Illinois Constitution. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a).
198. The dividend rate is the percentage of corporate income after taxes distributed as
dividends.
porate income subject to double taxation at the state level. 199
Finally, the result is affected by the provision in most state tax laws
disallowing state income taxes as deductions in computing corporate
net income for state tax purposes" °° and by the state tax treatment of
federal income taxes.20'
C. Dividend Credit
The adoption of a dividend credit method of integration at the
federal level will affect state revenues from the corporate income tax
only slightly. Under the dividend credit method, corporations con-
tinue to pay federal income tax. Thus, no change will result in the
federal corporate taxable income on which most states base corpo-
rate net income for purposes of their income tax law. If the corpora-
tion receives a dividend from another corporation, however, the
corporation will be required to include in taxable income for state
purposes the federal income tax paid by the payor of the dividend
that is attributable to the dividend.202 In the states whose corporate
income tax base conforms to the federal income tax base, however,
no provisions permit the recipient of a dividend to deduct the federal
income tax attributable to the dividend from taxable income.203 In
199. See the illustrations in Appendix I infra. Except for rate changes and the time value
of money, the long-run effect on state income tax revenues is not affected by the corporate
dividend rate because corporate earnings are distributed as dividends, distributed on termina-
tion of the corporation, or realized as income when a shareholder sells stock. This assumes
that the state taxes the gain on the sale as it taxes other income, which most states do. See, e.g.,
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303(a)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981). However, it is important to the
state to ascertain the effect in a particular year of income tax integration at the federal level on
its income tax system. Thus, the short run effects of the corporate dividend rate are quite
relevant.
200. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(b)(2)(B) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); N.Y. TAX LAW
ch. 60, § 208(9)(b)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980). This type of provision creates an interesting
problem if none of the adjustment described in notes 184-85 and accompanying text supra
apply, other than the add-back of state income tax deducted in computing federal taxable
income. The state income tax cannot be computed until the state taxable income is computed.
Since the state taxable income consists solely of the state income tax, however, the state income
tax cannot be computed until the state income tax is computed. If any other state adjustments
are made to federal taxable income, the problem can be algebraically resolved. Otherwise the
state income tax must be zero.
201. Illinois, New York, and Ohio do not permit the deduction of federal income taxes in
computing corporate or individual taxable income. See 41 STATE TAX REv. (CCH) No. 51, at
4, 6 (December 16, 1980). Six states, however, permit corporations to deduct federal income
taxes in computing taxable income, and seventeen states permit individuals to do likewise,
usually subject to limitations. Id The analysis in this article is based on the Illinois approach.
To this extent, modifications in the analysis must be made for those states with the opposite
approach.
The difficulty in determining the immediate effect of full integration on the income tax
systems of states similar to Ohio, Illinois, and New York is demonstrated by illustrations in
Appendix I infra.
202. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.12(1) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-
203(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9) (McKinney 1966 & Supp.
1981); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5733.04(f) (Page 1973); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7401(3)
(Purdon Supp. 1981).
203. If the new federal provisions requiring a recipient of a dividend to include all or a
portion of the federal corporate income tax attributable to the dividend in gross income are
these states, therefore, income tax revenues from corporations that
receive dividends will increase slightly.
204
The effect of the dividend credit method of integration at the
federal level on state individual income taxation varies. In Penn-
sylvania, no effect will occur since individual taxable income is com-
puted without regard to federal taxable income. Florida will also be
unaffected since no individual income tax exists in that state. Simi-
larly, in states where the individual income tax base conforms to the
federal income tax base20 5 no noticeable effect will result. Individu-
als receiving dividends will be required to include in taxable income
for state purposes the federal income tax paid by the corporation
that is attributable to the dividend.2 6 Because the tax laws of these
states do not contain provisions permitting the recipient of a divi-
dend to deduct the federal income tax attributable to the dividend
from taxable income,20 7 the revenue that these states receive from
individual income taxes will increase to some extent.20 8
The combined effect of a federal dividend credit method of inte-
gration on the corporate and individual income taxes of the states
varies according to the particular tax system of each state.2° In
placed in section 78 of the Internal Revenue Code, the conclusion in the text would need to be
changed. In this case, there would be no effect in those states whose income tax laws presently
exclude the section 78 "gross-up" from state taxable income. See notes 129-31 and accompa-
nying text supra. It is probable that new federal provisions would not be inserted in section 78.
204. See note 192 supra. In 1977, domestic corporations paid $61.5 billion in dividends, of
which $13.9 billion were paid to other domestic corporations. IRS 1977 CORPORTrION IN-
COME TAX STATISTICS, supra note 187, at 13. Of course, if the federal dividend credit provi-
sions do not permit recipients of dividends corporations to claim the credit, there would be no
effect on state corporate income tax revenues.
205. See note 191 and accompanying text supra If the state bases its individual income
tax liability on a percentage of federal individual income tax liability after credits, the effect of
integration on the state revenues is compounded.
206. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); N.Y. TAX LAW ch.
60, § 612 (McKinney Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 5747.01(S) (Page Supp. 1975).
207. See notes 203-04 and accompanying text supra. Likewise, there are no provisions in
the income tax laws of these states permitting the shareholder to claim a credit for the federal
income taxes paid by the corporation.
208. See note 192 and accompanying text supra In 1974, individuals listing Illinois as
their state of residence for federal tax purposes reported $1.7 billion in dividends, after the
dividend exclusion of section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code was applied. This statistic is
approximate for purposes of estimating the Illinois revenue effect because there may be a few
of those individuals whose residences for state tax purposes were not in Illinois, and there also
were some part-year Illinois residents. The statistic is, however, sufficiently approximate that
the impact of the dividend credit method of integration on Illinois revenues is evident. For
Ohio and New York, the amounts were $1.2 billion and $3.47 billion, respectively. U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, I.R.S., PRELIMINARY STATISTICS OF INCOME-1978 INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RETURNS, Pub. 198, at 49-50 (1980).
To estimate the amount of federal income tax attributable to those dividends that would
be included in state taxable income, these amounts must be multiplied by 48/52, the reciprocal
inverse of the approximate dividend to corporate federal income tax ratio. Thus, shareholders
in Illinois, Ohio, and New York would include approximately $1.57 billion, $1.1 billion, and
$3.2 billion in state individual taxable income, respectively.
209. See note 193 supra If no dividends are distributed in the state, no effect on state
income tax revenues will occur. See Appendix I infra This highly theoretical possibility is
pursued no further in this article.
Florida and Pennsylvania, where no effect will occur at the individ-
ual income tax level, an increase in state income tax revenues will
depend on the relative proportion of shareholders that are corpora-
tions and on the corporate dividend rate.2 1° In the other states-
Illinois, Ohio, and New York-the result will be an increase in reve-
nue from corporate and individual income taxes. The extent of the
increase depends on two factors. First, the corporate dividend rate is
relevant for the same reason it is a factor in determining the immedi-
ate effect of full integration on state income tax revenues. 21' Second,
the relative proportion of shareholders that are corporations and the
average corporate income tax rate in comparison to the average indi-
vidual income tax rate are important factors because they determine
the level at which the federal income tax paid by the payor of the
dividend will be subject to state income tax.212
D. Dividend Deduction
States that require corporations to compute state taxable income
by making adjustments to federal taxable income will be affected by
adoption of a dividend deduction method of integration at the fed-
eral level. Under the dividend deduction method of integration, fed-
eral taxable income of corporations is reduced to the extent of
dividends paid.2 3 Accordingly, state taxable income of the corpora-
tions is reduced and there will be a decrease in state corporate in-
come tax revenues.
214
The dividend deduction method of integration has no effect on
state individual income tax revenues. Florida has no individual in-
come tax. Pennsylvania calculates individual income without regard
to the federal system. Illinois, Ohio, and New York are not affected
210. See note 198 and accompanying text supra
211. See notes 198-99, 201 and accompanying text supra
212. For example, assume that Corporation X distributes a $1,000 dividend to its share-
holders. Further assume that the federal income tax paid by X with respect to that $1,000 is
$923. To pay a dividend of $1,000 when the federal corporate income tax rate is 48%, X must
earn $1,923 ($1,000 divided by .52, the correlative of .48). If the shareholders of X are corpo-
rations whose average state income tax rate is 5%, state income tax revenues increase by $46.15
($923 X .05). If the shareholders of X are individuals whose average state income tax rate is
3%, state income tax revenues increased by $27.69 ($923 x .03).
If some or all of the shareholders were corporations, the numbers in the example would
change, but the principle would remain unchanged. See note 201 supra and Appendix I mfra.
The result in this example differs from that with respect to full integration because, unlike the
case of full integration, the corporation pays state income tax. The importance of the corpo-
rate dividend rate is demonstrated by illustrations in Appendix 11 infra.
213. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. If no corporations pay dividends, which is
an extreme case, there would be no effect. This possibility is pursued no further in this article.
At the other extreme is maximum dividend payout. The effect on state corporate income tax
revenues in that case resembles full integration. See note 200 supra. The problem described in
note 200 supra with respect to computation of state income taxes does not exist if there is
partial dividend payout because in that case there is some corporate taxable income on which
algebraic computations mentioned in note 200 supra can be based.
214. See note 204 supra
because the federal individual income tax base to which the states
conform their individual income tax bases is not affected by the divi-
dend deduction method of integration.
The combined effect of the dividend deduction method of inte-
gration on the corporate and individual income taxes of the states is
a decrease in state income tax revenues.
E Dividend Exclusion
State revenues from the corporate income tax would be slightly
affected by the adoption of a dividend exclusion method of integra-
tion at the federal level. There is no effect on revenues from corpo-
rations that are shareholders in other corporations in states that
presently provide a full intercorporate dividend exclusion or deduc-
tion.215 In states that do not provide a full intercorporate dividend
exclusion or deduction 2 1 6 state corporate income tax revenues from
these corporations will decrease.21 7
The effect of the dividend exclusion method of integration on
state individual income taxation varies. In Pennsylvania, no effect
occurs because individual taxable income is computed without re-
gard to federal taxable income. In Florida, no effect occurs because
no individual income tax exists. In states in which the individual
income tax base conforms to the federal income tax base, the effect
depends on the technical language of the state tax law. In Illinois,
there is no effect because the tax statute requires individuals to add
to taxable income all dividends that were excluded from federal
gross income. 2 18 Because New York and Ohio do not have similar
provisions219 individual income tax revenues in these states will de-
crease because the dividends excluded from federal taxable income
are not added back.22°
The combined effect of the dividend exclusion method varies
from state to state. In Florida, the result is a decrease in corporate
income tax revenues from corporations that are shareholders. The
amount of the decrease is the extent of the tax attributable to the
215. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.04(I)(4), (6), (7), (8) (Page 1973); 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7401(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
216. New York permits exclusion of one-half of dividends received from corporations that
are not subsidiaries, and of all dividends from subsidiaries. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60,
§ 208(9)(a)(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1981). Florida and Illinois adopt the federal 85% divi-
dend received deduction. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13(2) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
120, § 2-203(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). See note 3 supra
217. See note 204 jupra.
218. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(a)(2)(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
219. If the provision in the state tax law that requires individuals to add back dividends
excluded from federal gross income does so by reference to section 116 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, the outcome will change depending on whether the dividend exclusion underlying
integration at the federal level is placed in section 116.
220. See note 208 jupra
fifteen percent of intercorporate dividends not already excluded.22 '
Pennsylvania will experience no effect since corporations that are
shareholders presently exclude intercorporate dividends, 222 and indi-
vidual income taxes are computed without regard to federal taxable
income. In Ohio, state income tax revenues decrease as a result of
the exclusion of dividends from individual taxable income.2 21 The
effect is the same in New York, except an additional decrease in state
income tax revenues results because certain intercorporate dividends
not presently excluded are excluded.224 In Illinois, as in Florida,225
corporations are required to add back excluded dividends to taxable
income, with a resultant decrease in corporate income tax revenues
from corporations that are shareholders.
F Split Corporate Tax Rates
Because the split-value method of integration involves the com-
putation of tax and not taxable income, states will not be affected by
adoption of this method at the federal level.22 6 No state requires
corporations to compute state income tax liability as a percentage of
federal income tax liability.
2 27
G. Repeal of Corporate Income Tax
States that require corporations to compute state taxable income
by making adjustments to federal taxable income would be ad-
versely affected by the repeal of the federal corporate income tax. If
the double taxation of corporate earnings distributed as dividends is
terminated by repeal of the federal corporate income tax, state taxa-
ble income of the corporation will be zero, unless the corporation has
items of income excluded from its federal gross income or has taken
deductions on its federal return for which there are adjustments re-
quired by the state tax law. The states, therefore, will experience a
drastic decrease in corporate income tax revenues.228
221. Id
222. Id
223. See notes 219-20 and accompanying text supra
224. See note 216 supra In New York, the relative proportion of shareholders that are
corporations and the average corporate income tax rate in comparison to the average individ-
ual income tax rate will affect the measurement of the revenue loss, in the same manner as
those factors affect the analysis of the dividend credit method of integration. See note 212
supraz
225. See note 216 and accompanying text supra.
226. Even though the imposition of a zero percent tax on income that is distributed as
dividends is a form of split-rate integration that produces the same result at the federal level as
the dividend deduction method of integration, see note 37 supra, the effect at the state level
differs because the latter method relies on a change in the definition of taxable income while
the former does not.
227. If there were such states, their revenues from the corporate income tax would be
affected. This analysis is pursued no further in this article.
228. The effect at the corporate level is the same as it is with respect to full integration.
See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
Adoption of integration by repeal of the federal corporate in-
come tax will not affect state individual income tax revenue because
individual income tax is not changed under this method.229
The combined effect of the repeal of the federal corporate in-
come tax is a significant decrease in state income tax revenues.
IV. The State in Isolation: The Response to Income Tax
Integration
A. Reasonsfor Response
1. Adoption of Integration
(a) Automatic.-A state may effectively adopt certain methods
of integration if its tax law contains a provision that automatically
adopts any change in the federal tax law relating to the computation
of gross, adjusted gross, or taxable income.230 The Illinois tax law,
for example, provides as follows:
[A] taxpayer's gross income, adjusted gross income, or taxa-
ble income for the taxable year shall mean the amount of gross
income, adjusted gross income or taxable income properly report-
able for federal income tax purposes for the taxable year under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.23'
In states whose corporate and individual income tax bases conform
to the federal income tax bases, 232 automatic adoption of virtually
233
full integration will occur.234 Automatic adoption of the dividend
credit and dividend exclusion methods of integration will occur if a
state bases individual income tax liability on a percentage of federal
income tax liability after credits.2 35 A state whose corporate taxable
229. If the $100 dividend exclusion were repealed, see note 40 supra, states that have
adopted this provision of the federal law in their conformity to the federal income tax system
would experience a slight increase in individual income tax revenues. See notes 219-20 and
accompanying text supra.
230. This type of provision does not cause adoption of the split-rate method of integration.
231. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). This provision is
permitted by the Illinois Constitution, which provides:
Laws imposing taxes on or measured by income may adopt by reference provisions of
the laws and regulations of the United States, as they then exist or thereafter may be
changed, for the purpose of arriving at the amount of income upon which the tax is
imposed.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(b). The use of automatic "trigger" statutes that cause state adoption of
all federal tax law changes without state legislative action has probably stopped. See the
description of the experience of Oregon with such a provision in REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS, FEDERAL COLLEC-
TION OF STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES UNDER PUBLIC LAW 92-512, at 28-29 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as NATA REPORT]. See note 181 supra.
232. Twenty-eight states have corporate and individual income tax bases that conform to
the respective federal base. See 41 STATE TAx REv. (CCH) No. 51, at 4-7 (December 16,
1980).
233. The existence of state adjustments to federal taxable income prevents complete adop-
tion of full integration. See notes 184-88 and accompanying text supra
234. See notes 193-201 and accompanying text supra.
235. If the state income tax liability of an individual is computed as a percentage of fed-
income base conforms to the federal corporate taxable income base
will automatically adopt the dividend deduction and corporate in-
come tax repeal methods of integration, unless the state tax law has
provisions preventing this effect.23 6 Automatic adoption of the divi-
dend exclusion method of integration will result in a state if its indi-
vidual taxable income base conforms to the federal individual
income tax base, unless its tax law requires the add-back of divi-
dends.237 Finally, in Florida, which has no individual income tax, a
form of integration already exists since dividends are not taxed
238twice.
(b) Piggybacking.-A "piggybacking" system includes an
agreement between a state and the Secretary of the Treasury for fed-
eral collection of state income taxes. If piggybacking is in effect
when integration is adopted at the federal level, automatic adoption
of integration will occur. The piggybacking provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code23 9 apply only if the individual income taxes of the
state that enters into the federal collection agreement conform to the
federal income tax base.2"° Thus, unless a state is willing to with-
draw from a piggybacking agreement that is in effect between itself
and the Secretary of the Treasury, it will adopt integration.
(c) Precedent and tradition.-States whose tax laws do not
cause automatic adoption of income tax integration may find that
tradition mandates the adoption of integration. At least thirty-three
states have individual income tax bases that conform to the federal
individual income tax base. 241 At least thirty-five states have corpo-
rate income tax bases that conform to the federal corporate income
tax base.242 If the state tax law conforms to the federal individual
income tax base on a particular date,243 or if the method of integra-
tion adopted at the federal level is one that does not cause an auto-
eral income tax liability before federal credits, there will not be complete adoption of the
dividend credit method of integration. See note 205 supra
236. See note 181 supra
237. See note 218 and accompanying text supra If the provision in the state tax law that
requires individuals to add back dividends excluded from federal gross income does so by
reference to section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code, integration will be adopted if the divi-
dend exclusion underlying integration at the federal level is not placed in section 116. See
note 219 supra.
238. As explained in the text accompanying note 194 supra, however, the immediate effect
of the adoption of full integration at the federal level on the income tax system of Florida
would be no taxation of corporate earnings, whether or not distributed as dividends.
239. I.R.C. §§ 6361-6365.
240. Id § 6362. The conformity can be by reference to federal taxable income or adjusted
gross income, or the computation of state income tax liability by reference to federal income
tax liability. See note 191 supra.
241. See note 191 supra
242. See note 181 supra
243. Id
matic adoption of integration under the state tax law, 2' integration
will not be adopted by the state unless it affirmatively decides to do
so. If a state does not adopt integration, its individual tax system
will be considerably dissimilar to the federal system. The state will
lose its traditional similarity to the federal system, and the benefits of
that similarity. 45 Subtle political pressure may persuade the state to
follow in the footsteps of the federal government. 2  Although some
states structure their income tax systems independently of the federal
system,247 a substantial number follow the federal structure, indicat-
ing a reluctance to stray from federal statutory tax precedent. Many
states follow, either fully or partially, the federal integration treat-
ment of Subchapter S corporations248 and DISCs.2 49 Hence, it is
possible that integration will occur even in states in which adoption
is not automatic.
(d) Internal revenue gain-A state might adopt integration be-
cause it anticipates an increase in income tax revenues. 250 For exam-
ple, adoption of full integration at the federal level would cause
increased revenues in a state if the state's corporate and individual
income tax bases conform to the federal base, provided that the aver-
age individual income tax rate exceeds the average corporate income
tax rate and the average corporate dividend rate is not too close to
full earnings distribution.25' Increased revenues would also occur in
a state whose corporate and individual income tax bases conform to
the federal base if the dividend credit method of integration were
adopted at the federal level.2 52 As noted below,253 however, this as-
pect of the adoption of income tax integration at the federal level is
significant only as an analytical starting-point-when the state ex-
amines its revenue position in light of the existence of other states in
the federal system.
244. The split-rate method of integration is an example. See notes 226-27 and accompa-
nying text supra
245. This may trouble some state taxpayers. See note 258 and accompanying text infra
246. The proponents of integration at the federal level probably will focus on the state
legislatures if they are successful in Congress.
247. Pennsylvania for example, has adopted a very unique individual income tax. See
note 190 and accompanying text supra.
248. See, e.g., notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra For additional examples of ad-
ministrative variations of state income tax treatment of Subchapter S corporations, see notes
521-31 and accompanying text infra.
249. See, e.g., notes 116-20 and accompanying text supra There is also some degree of
state conformity with respect to regulated investment companies and real estate investment
trusts, which resemble integration. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5733.04 (Page 1973).
250. See notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra
251. See Appendix I ifra.
252. See Appendix II infra.
253. See notes 330-41 and accompanying text mfra.
(e) External revenue gain. -An anticipated shift of income tax
revenue from outside a state to within it might persuade the state to
adopt integration. This extremely complex aspect of the adoption of
income tax integration at the federal level is explored below.254
(0 Administrative andpragmatic reasons.- A state might adopt
integration to avoid administrative and pragmatic problems that
would otherwise arise. If the federal government ceases to impose
an income tax on corporations, 255 the state that continues such a tax
will be required to assume the burden of developing the law and
policy of corporate income tax. This problem would not be immedi-
ately noticeable, but would be aggravated as social, economic, and
political climates change. The state that continues a corporate in-
come tax would lose the benefits of congressional studies, Treasury
regulations and rulings, and federal judicial resolutions. 256 Most
states that reject integration257 must develop special adjustments to
their tax statutes and tax forms. The additional complexity to the
state tax statute alone is a serious problem.258
2. Rejection of Integration
(a) Automatic.-A state may, in effect, reject integration be-
cause its state tax laws are so independent of federal tax laws that
under certain methods of integration there is no change in state cor-
porate and individual income taxation. For example, the split-rate
method of integration is automatically rejected because it has no ef-
fect on any state.259 In Pennsylvania, where individual income taxa-
tion is independent of the federal system, the dividend credit26° and
dividend exclusion 26' methods of integration will be rejected until
the legislature affirmatively adopts integration.
(b) Constitutional problems.- The constitution of a state could
require rejection of one or more methods of integration. For exam-
ple, the Illinois Constitution provides that "tax on or measured by
income shall be at a non-graduated rate"262 and therefore precludes
adoption of the split-rate method of integration. The constitution of
254. Id
255. This occurs if full integration is adopted and if the corporate income tax is repealed.
See notes 21-25, 39-40 and accompanying text supra;
256. This is not to suggest that a state could not maintain a corporate income tax system in
the absence of a comparable federal corporate income tax.
257. See notes 290-314 and accompanying text infra This is not true with respect to the
split-rate method of integration.
258. This is especially true if the state has intentionally taken advantage of conformity to
the federal income tax system.
259. See notes 226-27 and accompanying text supra
260. See notes 201-12 and accompanying text Supra
261. See notes 215-25 and accompanying text supra
262. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a).
New York provides that "[u]ndistributed profits shall not be
taxed." '263 This provision apparently prevents adoption of full inte-
gration.26 In a case upholding the taxation of a shareholder on his
share of the undistributed taxable income of a Subchapter S corpora-
tion,265 however, a New York court held the constitutional provision
to be offset by another constitutional provision 266 that authorizes
adoption of federal law in any New York law imposing an income
tax.
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(c) State autonomy.-A state's desire to be independent of the
federal income tax system could cause it to ignore the federal adop-
tion of integration. This reaction parallels the reaction of states
whose tax systems have traditional similarity to the federal system.
(d) Internal revenue loss.-Under certain circumstances, a
state might reject integration because adoption would result in a de-
crease in income tax revenues.268 If full integration, for example,
were adopted at the federal level a decrease in revenue would result
in a state whose tax base conforms to the federal base, but with no
individual income tax,269 or with an individual income tax that is
computed without regard to the federal system.27° A similar effect
would result in a state whose corporate and individual income tax
bases conform to the federal base if full integration is adopted at the
federal level, provided that the average corporate income tax rate
exceeds the average individual income tax rate.27t A third example
arises in a state whose corporate income tax base conforms to the
federal base if a dividend deduction or corporate income tax repeal
method of integration is adopted at the federal level.2 72 A final ex-
ample involves adoption of a dividend exclusion method of integra-
tion at the federal level and states with a tax system similar to those
in Florida, Ohio, New York, or Illinois.273 This aspect of the adop-
tion of income tax integration at the federal level should not be of
much significance, however, when the state examines its revenue po-
sition in light of the existence of other states in a federal system.
274
263. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
264. See Letter from James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of
New York, to James E. Maule (January 11, 1978) at 4 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
265. See notes 93, 96 and accompanying text supra
266. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 22.
267. Garlin v. Murphy, 51 Misc. 2d 477, 273 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966).
268. See notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra;
269. See notes 189-91 and accompanying text supra.
270. See note 195 and accompanying text supra
271. See Appendix I infra. Another example is if the average individual income tax rate
exceeds the average corporate income tax rate and the average corporate dividend payout rate
is sufficiently high. See column 3 of illustration at Appendix I infra.
272. See notes 213-15, 228-29 and accompanying text supra.
273. See notes 221-25 and accompanying text supra
274. See notes 330-41 and accompanying text infrax
(e) External revenue loss. -Integration could be rejected by a
state because it anticipates a shift of income tax revenue from within
its borders to outside them. This extremely complex aspect of the
adoption of income tax integration at the federal level is explored
below.
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69 Administrative andpragmatic reasons.-A state might reject
integration to avoid administrative and pragmatic problems that
otherwise would arise.276 Numerous problems exist even if no non-
resident corporations or shareholders are subject to income taxation
by a state that adopts integration.277 Under full integration or a divi-
dend credit method of integration, for example, corporations would
be required to maintain detailed tax records on each shareholder,
just as partnerships must maintain tax records for their partners.278
These problems would be similar to those experienced by Massachu-
setts with its integrated property tax.279 The advent of computerized
record keeping, however, would minimize problems in this area.28°
Unresolved issues at the federal level pose serious problems for
states and may detract from the desirability of integration. Although
a state that adopts integration probably will accept the federal reso-
lution of these issues, a state could decide that the federal resolution
creates additional problems. The state that resolves the problem dif-
ferently than at the federal level might find that the resolution itself
will create problems. If these problems are sufficiently troublesome
or require solutions that conflict with fundamental state policy, the
state might decide to reject integration. Some of these problems
28'
are the treatment of shareholders who own stock for less than a full
taxable year,282 the treatment of subsequent audit adjustments to
corporate distributive or taxable income,2 83 and the treatment of
shareholders that are tax-exempt organizations.284 Other problems
include the need for transitional rules to specify the treatment of ac-
275. Id
276. Many of these problems involve the interstate aspects of state income taxation and
are discussed in notes 330-502 and accompanying text infra.
277. The interstate aspects of state income taxation compounds these problems.
278. See McKessy, supra note 7, in which the author states that the "filing tax require-
ments that partnerships and their partners must comply with are currently the most burden-
some that any form of business can or will encounter." Id at 378. Mr. McKessy suggests that
the paperwork will overwhelm taxpayer and tax administrator alike, as well as hinder enforce-
ment and discourage compliance. Id
279. See notes 52-63 and accompanying text supra.
280. But see Clarke, supra note 7, at 376. The position suggested by Mr. Clarke finds
support in the phenomenal increase in the number and complexity of corporate transactions in
the past one hundred years, which might more than offset the advances in the computerized
data processing field made in the past twenty-five years.
281. These problems do not arise with respect to every method of income tax integration.
282. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 71; Gourevitch, supra note 26, at 87.
283. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 74; Gourevitch, supra note 26, at 87.
284. Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 49.
cumulated undistributed income285 and the treatment of dividends
paid in property and constructive dividends.286
An interesting pragmatic issue is whether integration will bene-
fit a state economy as it presumably will benefit the national econ-
omy. 287 The problems that proponents of integration seek to solve at
the federal level may not exist at the state level,288 and a state there-
fore may not necessarily require integration.289
B. Methods of Rejecting Integration
1. Full Integration.- States that require corporations to com-
pute state taxable income by making adjustments to federal taxable
income can easily avoid the effect that full integration at the federal
level might have on state corporate income taxation.29° Since corpo-
rations are required under full integration to continue computing
federal net income to determine the distributive share of each share-
holder,29' states can require corporations to compute state taxable
income by making adjustments to federal net income. 92
Whether a state must adjust its individual income tax if full in-
tegration is adopted at the federal level depends on the effect of full
integration on the individual income tax system of the state. In
Pennsylvania, no response is required because the adoption of full
integration at the federal level does not affect the individual income
tax.29 3 States whose individual income tax base conforms to the fed-
eral income tax base can avoid the effect on state individual income
taxation of full integration 294 by requiring shareholders to deduct
285. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 361, 366; McLure, Integration of Personal and Corporate
Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 1, at 567.
286. Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at
55-56.
287. The proponents of income tax integration argue that its adoption would enhance
capital formation. See note 4 supra.
288. McKessy, supra note 7, at 377. Mr. McKessy mentions the special state taxation of
certain businesses and the lack of a federal property or sales tax. Id
289. Although this may be true, the double taxation of dividends by states, from the stand-
point of the national economy, compounds the effect of double taxation at the federal level.
290. See notes 181-88 and accompanying text supra.
291. See note 185 supra; Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio
Department of Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 2 (on file at the Dickinson
School of Law).
292. There probably will be very little difference between federal corporate taxable in-
come and federal corporate net income. If certain items such as corporate charitable contribu-
tions are separately stated, the state will need to net the items together. Another difference
would arise from the probable repeal of the inter-corporate dividends received deduction. An
adjustment to continue the deduction at the state level will be needed in states that presently
provide for it. See Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio Depart-
ment of Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 2 (on file at the Dickinson School
of Law).
293. See notes 189-90 and accompanying text supra,
294. See notes 191-92 and accompanying text supra
their shares of undistributed taxable income of corporations295 from
federal taxable income, 96 for purposes of computing state taxable
income.
2 Dividend Credit.- Generally, if the dividend credit method
of integration is adopted, states need not alter the corporate income
tax to avoid adopting integration. 97 Some action will be needed,
however, to avoid the effect of the dividend credit method on the
computation of corporate taxable income by corporations that are
shareholders. 298  The necessary adjustment is identical to the adjust-
ment required in the individual income tax of states with individual
income tax bases that conform to the federal income tax base.299
As with full integration, a state's decision to modify the individ-
ual income tax in response to the adoption of the dividend credit
method depends on the effect of the dividend credit method of inte-
gration on the individual income tax system of the state. In Penn-
sylvania, no action is required because adoption of the dividend
credit method of integration will not affect its individual income
tax.3" States whose individual income tax bases conform to the fed-
eral income tax base can avoid the effect on state individual income
taxation of the dividend credit method of integration 30 ' by requiring
shareholders to deduct their share of the federal corporate income
tax attributable to the dividend from federal taxable income302 for
purposes of computing state taxable income.
295. Undistributed taxable income of corporations is the distributive share of corporate
net income minus dividends. This formulation will permit the state to tax dividends.
296. See Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio Department of
Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 2 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
For the few states that require individuals to compute income tax liability as a percentage of
federal income tax liability, the adjustment will be somewhat complex. These states must al-
low a credit against the income tax liability of the individual in an amount equal to the federal
income tax liability of the individual with respect to the undistributed taxable income of the
corporation, multiplied by the percentage used to compute state income tax liability from fed-
eral income tax liability. See note 295 supra This raises the issue of how to compute the
federal income tax liability of an individual on the undistributed taxable income of the
corporation.
297. See note 201 and accompanying text supra
298. See notes 202-04 and accompanying text supra
299. Even states that do not need to adjust their taxation of individual income must alter
taxation of corporate income to reject income tax integration.
300. See note 205 and accompanying text supra
301. See notes 205-08 and accompanying text supra
302. See Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio Department of
Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 3 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
For the few states that require individuals to compute income tax liability as a percentage of
federal income tax liability, the adjustment will be rather complex. These states will need to
do several things. First, these states will need to add to the tax liability of the individual an
amount equal to the federal corporate income tax attributable to the dividend, multiplied by
the percentage used to compute state income tax liability from federal income tax liability.
Second, these states will need to allow a credit against the tax liability of the individual in an
amount equal to the federal income tax liability of the individual on the corporate income tax
attributable to the dividend, multiplied by the percentage used to compute state income tax
liability from federal income tax liability. As with full integration, this raises the issue of how
3. Dividend Deduction. -States that require corporations to
compute state taxable income by making adjustments to federal tax-
able income can easily avoid the effect of the dividend deduction
method at the federal level on state corporate income taxation.30 3
Since corporations are allowed a deduction for dividends paid under
the dividend deduction method of integration, these states can re-
quire corporations to add back the dividends paid deduction to fed-
eral taxable income for purposes of computing state taxable
income.
Since the adoption of the dividend deduction method of inte-
gration at the federal level does not affect state individual income
taxation,305 states can reject integration by inaction with respect to
the individual income tax.3 °6
4. Dividend Exclusion.-In general, states adjust the corporate
income tax to avoid adopting integration if the federal government
adopts the dividend exclusion method of integration.30 7 Some action
will be needed, however, to avoid the effect of the dividend exclusion
method on computation of corporate taxable income in those states
where the amount, if any, of the intercorporate dividend exclusion or
deduction is increased by the adoption of this method of integra-
tion.308 In these states, corporations that are shareholders must be
required to add back to federal taxable income, in computing state
taxable income, the portion of the intercorporate dividend that the
state does not wish to exclude from state income taxation.
As with full integration and the dividend credit method of inte-
gration, whether a state must respond by adjusting its individual in-
come tax if the dividend exclusion method is adopted at the federal
level depends on the effect of the dividend exclusion method of inte-
gration on the individual income tax system of the state. In Penn-
sylvania and Illinois, no action is required because the adoption of
the dividend exclusion method does not affect their individual in-
come tax.309 In New York and Ohio, individuals, in computing state
taxable income, must be required to add back to federal taxable in-
come the dividends that the state does not wish to exclude from state
to compute the federal income tax liability of an individual on the corporate income tax attrib-
utable to the dividend. See note 296 supra
303. See notes 213-14 and accompanying text supra
304. See Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio Department of
Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 2 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
305. See note 215 and accompanying text supra
306. Of course, the proper corporate adjustments must be made. See note 304 and accom-
panying text supra.
307. See note 215 and accompanying text supra
308. See notes 216-17 and accompanying text supra.
309. See note 218 and accompanying text supra
income taxation. °
5. Split Corporate Tax Rate.-Since adoption of the split-rate
method of integration at the federal level does not effect state income
taxation, 311 the states can reject integration by inaction.
6. Repeal of Corporate Income Tax.-States that require cor-
porations to compute state taxable income by making adjustments to
federal taxable income must take steps to avoid the effect that repeal
of federal corporate income tax would have on state corporate in-
come taxation. These states must define corporate taxable income
either by adoption of their own sets of rules for gross income and
deductions or by reference to the Internal Revenue Code as it existed
prior to the repeal of the federal corporate income tax. Both meth-
ods require the states to assume responsibility for shaping corporate
income tax policy in the future. 2
Since repeal of the federal corporate income tax does not affect
state individual income taxation,31 3 the states can effectively reject
integration by allowing the individual income tax to remain
intact.314
C Methods ofAdopting Integration
1. Full Integration. -States that require corporations to com-
pute state taxable income by making adjustments to federal taxable
income can adopt full integration by not changing the corporate in-
come tax.315
The effect of full integration at the federal level on the state
individual income tax system determines whether the state must act
upon its individual income tax to adopt full integration. States
whose individual income tax base conforms to the federal income
310. Ifa state that requires that dividends excluded from gross income be added back to
state taxable income does so by reference to section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code, there is
no need for action if the federal dividend exclusion provisions are placed in section 116. If the
federal provisions are placed in another section, however, the action required by the state is the
addition of a reference to that section in the provisions of its income tax law requiring that
dividends excluded from gross income be added back to state taxable income. See note 219
.rupra.
311. See notes 226-27 and accompanying text supra
312. See notes 255-56 and accompanying text supra.
313. See note 218 and accompanying text supra
314. Of course, the proper corporate adjustments must be made.
315. Two technical amendments would be required. One amendment is needed to require
shareholders to include in taxable income their distributive shares of the adjustments to federal
corporate taxable income for purposes of computing state corporate taxable income under
present law. See notes 184-87 and accompanying text supra The second amendment is
needed to repeal the requirement that state corporate income taxes deducted in computing
federal taxable income of corporations must be added back to that income. This amendment
would resolve the problem outlined in note 200 supra. These amendments are not needed by
states that require individuals to compute income tax liability as a percentage of federal in-
come tax liability.
tax base can adopt full integration by inaction.31 6 In Pennsylvania,
the state tax law would need a new provision requiring individuals to
include in income their shares of the undistributed net income of the
corporation.1 7
2. Dividend Credit.- States will not need to modify the corpo-
rate income tax to adopt the dividend credit method of integration
because this method generally does not affect the income taxation of
corporations.318 Certain adjustments must be made, however, in the
computation of corporate tax liability by corporations that are share-
holders.319 These modifications are identical to the adjustments that
are necessary in the individual income tax of states whose individual
income tax bases conform to the federal income tax base.
The changes that must be made in the individual income tax in
order to adopt the dividend credit method vary according to the in-
dividual income tax system of the particular state. Pennsylvania tax
law would need two new provisions. One provision would permit
individuals receiving corporate dividends to claim a tax credit for the
portion of the state income tax paid by the corporation that is attrib-
utable to those dividends. A second provision would include that
credit in the income of the individuals. States whose individual in-
come tax bases conform to the federal income tax base must take the
two steps necessary in Pennsylvania and add a third step.320 The
third step requires shareholders to deduct their share of the corpo-
rate federal income tax attributable to the dividend from taxable
income.32'
3. Dividend Deduction.- States that require corporations to
compute state taxable income by making adjustments to federal tax-
316. This conclusion assumes that proper action is taken regarding the corporate income
tax. See note 315 supra.
317. See note 295 supra
318. See note 202 and accompanying text supra.
319. See notes 202-04 and accompanying text supra.
320. See note 321 and accompanying text infra For the few states that require individuals
to compute income tax liability as a percentage of federal income tax liability, the required
steps are quite complex. First, the steps outlined in note 302 supra must be taken. Next, the
state income tax paid by the corporation that is attributable to the dividends must be com-
puted. See note 296 supra. The amount so computed is the dividend credit against the state
income tax liability of the shareholder. In addition, however, this state credit must itself be
included, in effect, in state taxable income. To do so, the federal income tax liability that
would be attributable to that state income tax if it were included in federal taxable income
must be computed, and multiplied by the percentage used to compute state income tax liability
from Federal income tax liability.
It is incorrect to assume that since the federal income tax liability of individuals in these
states reflects the adoption of the dividend credit method of integration, no action must be
taken. The complexity arises because the federal income tax liability takes into accountfed-
eral income taxes paid by the corporation, and not state income taxes paid by it.
321. See note 302 and accompanying text supra. For the few states that require individu-
als to compute income tax liability as a percentage of federal income tax liability, this step
requires the complicated computations outlined in note 302 supra
able income can adopt the dividend deduction method of integration
without changing the corporate income tax. Similarly, states need
not alter the individual income tax in order to adopt integration
since adoption of the dividend deduction method at the federal level
does not affect state individual income taxation.
322
4. Dividend Exclusion.-The corporate income tax does not
have to be modified by the state in order to adopt the dividend exclu-
sion method of integration because adoption of that method does not
affect income taxation of corporations that pay dividends. 323 Since
corporations that are shareholders exclude or deduct intercorporate
dividends from federal taxable income in computing state taxable
income as a consequence of the dividend exclusion method of inte-
gration no action is needed to adopt integration. The computation
of the state taxable income of these corporations is essentially
unchanged.324
The nature of the individual income tax system of a state deter-
mines whether modifications must be made in the individual income
tax in order to adopt the dividend exclusion method. In New York
and Ohio, no action is necessary because individuals in these states
would exclude dividends from taxable income if the dividend exclu-
sion method were adopted at the federal level.325 Illinois would
need to repeal its provision requiring individuals to add back to tax-
able income all dividends that were excluded from federal gross in-
come. 326  Pennsylvania tax law would need a new provision
permitting individuals to exclude dividends from gross income.327
5. Split Corporate Tax Rates.-A state can adopt the split-rate
method of integration by adjusting its corporate income tax rates to
provide a lower rate on corporate income distributed as dividends.
The individual income tax does not need to be altered.
6. Repeal of Corporate Income Tax.-States requiring corpo-
rations to compute state taxable income by making adjustments to
federal taxable income would need to eliminate those adjustments in
order to eliminate the state income tax on this income.328 Since re-
322. See note 215 and accompanying text supra
323. Id
324. See notes 216-17 and accompanying text supra.
325. See notes 219-20 and accompanying text supra
326. See note 218 and accompanying text supra
327. If a state that requires that dividends excluded from gross income be added back to
state taxable income does so by reference to section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code, there is
no need for action if section 116 is repealed, but action must be taken if the federal dividend
exclusion provisions are placed in section 116. This result is the opposite of that needed to
reject integration. See note 310 supra
328. See note 228 and accompanying text supra.
peal of the federal corporate income tax does not affect state individ-
ual income taxation,329 states do not need to adjust the individual
income tax to adopt this method of integration.
V. The State in a Federal System: The Effect of Income Tax
Integration
A. Revenue Shfts
Since shareholders are often residents of states other than those
in which their corporation is resident,33° it seems likely that full inte-
gration or the dividend credit method of integration at the federal
level will cause sizeable revenue shifts among the states. 33' The fed-
eral nature of modem business transactions could also prevent maxi-
mum achievement of the goals a state sets when it decides to adopt
or reject integration. An examination of the fundamental premises
of revenue shifts aids analysis of the situation.332
Full integration causes a shifting of income tax liability from
the corporation to the shareholder.333 The basic premise of revenue
shifting applicable when full integration occurs is that income tax
revenues shift from states with a proportionately larger share of cor-
porate residents to those with a proportionately larger share of share-
holder residents. For example, if a corporation is a resident of Ohio
and its shareholders are residents of Illinois, the tax revenues of Illi-
nois will increase while those of Ohio will decrease.334 Certain steps
can be taken to avoid this consequence.335
The basic premise when the dividend credit method of integra-
tion is adopted is the opposite of the premise that is applicable to full
integration. The dividend credit method causes a shifting of income
tax liability from the shareholder to the corporation if the marginal
tax rate of the shareholder is less than the corporate tax rate. It
causes a shifting of income tax liability from the corporation to the
shareholder if the marginal tax rate of the shareholder is greater than
the corporate tax rate.336 Consequently, income tax revenues will
329. See note 229 and accompanying text supra.
330. See notes 178-79 supra
331. See Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1,
at 63. One writer called these shifts "serious" and "disastrous." Clarke, supra note 7, at 375.
332. These revenue shifts are analyzed in the next section. See notes 357-502 and accom-
panying text infra Moreover, due to the complex nature of the federal relationship among the
states, the effect of the response of one state in adopting or rejecting integration on the income
tax system of another state may be different from the effect of its doing nothing in response to
the adoption at the federal level of income tax integration. As to a third state, no effect may
occur.
333. Shareholders would pay all, not a portion as they presently pay, of the income tax
revenues attributable to corporate net income.
334. See McKessy, supra note 7, at 378-79.
335. See notes 360-445 and accompanying text infra For example, these steps might in-
clude taxation by Ohio of the Illinois shareholders.
336. The shareholder dividend credit usually will exceed the individual income tax on
shift from states with shareholder residents with relatively lower
marginal tax rates to states with shareholder residents with relatively
higher marginal tax rates, assuming no difference exists in the pro-
portionate distribution of corporate residents. If the proportionate
distribution of corporate residents is unequal, variations and rever-
sals of the revenue shifts will occur.337
The basic premise underlying revenue shifts among the states
when the dividend deduction, corporate tax repeal, and split-rate
methods of integration are adopted is that corporate income tax rev-
enue losses will affect states that collect relatively more tax from cor-
porations than from shareholders.338 This occurs because revenue
losses339 are at the corporate income tax level34  under these
methods.
Finally, if the dividend exclusion method of integration is
adopted, individual income tax revenue losses will affect states that
collect relatively more tax from shareholders than from corporations.
This occurs because revenue losses are at the individual income tax
level under the dividend exclusion method.34 '
B. Equity Considerations
Income tax integration presents the states with a serious ques-
tion about the source of the revenues they use to provide services to
their corporate and individual residents. This question primarily
arises if the state income tax burden is shifted from the corporation
to the individual. It also arises if the shift is in the opposite direction
or if the state rejects integration, because the responses of the other
states to integration will affect residents of the state that adopts or
rejects integration.342
The question about the source of the revenues used to provide
state services can be illustrated by a simple example of income tax
integration at the state level.34 3 Assume that two states, Massachu-
setts and Mississippi, take the steps necessary to conform their in-
come tax systems to the adoption of full integration at the federal
dividends, except in the highest individual income tax brackets. See illustration in Appendix
II infra.
337. The various permutations of these factors are too numerous and complex to illustrate
individually in this article.
338. See Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1,
at 63.
339. The revenue losses are caused by elimination of the double taxation of corporate
earnings distributed as dividends.
340. See Comm'n on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1,
at 63.
341. See note 224 supra.
342. See notes 357-502 and accompanying text ihafra
343. This example, which in many ways served as a catalyst for the numerous examples in
the next section, was suggested in Clarke, supra note 7, at 375.
level. Assume that as so conformed, the tax statutes of both states
subject resident shareholders, but not nonresident shareholders, to
income taxation on their shares of undistributed net income of the
corporations of which they are shareholders. 3 " Assume that X Cor-
poration is resident in Massachusetts, and its shareholders are resi-
dents of Mississippi. Under full integration, the income of X
Corporation is taxed by Mississippi in the hands of the shareholders,
but not by Massachusetts. Massachusetts, however, must continue to
provide many services directly to X Corporation because of the pres-
ence of corporate physical property in the state.
345
A more complex example of integration at the state level illus-
trates how the question about the source of revenues used to pay for
state services can arise when a state rejects integration. Assume that
Massachusetts decides to reject integration and structures its income
tax system to produce that result. Mississippi, on the other hand,
adopts full integration and taxes its resident and nonresident share-
holders only on their shares of the undistributed net income of cor-
porations resident in Mississippi. 3 Assume that X Corporation is
resident in Massachusetts and all except one of its shareholders are
residents of Mississippi. The other shareholder is a resident of Mas-
sachusetts. Under this income tax system, X Corporation is subject
to income taxation in Massachusetts. The shareholders who are resi-
dents of Mississippi are not subject to income tax on their share of
the undistributed net income of X Corporation. The Massachusetts
shareholder is subject to income tax by Massachusetts on any divi-
dends received from X Corporation. This shareholder might raise a
question of equity concerning the source of revenues used to pay for
services provided by Massachusetts to X Corporation. The question
arises because the share of the net income of X Corporation distrib-
uted as a dividend to the Massachusetts shareholder is subject to
344. It is probable that such a method of taxing nonresident shareholders under full inte-
gration would not be adopted. See McKessy, supra note 7, at 378-79; notes 360-445 and ac-
companying text infra.
345. One writer explained, "When a fire breaks out in the corporation's warehouse in
Boston the fire alarm does not ring in Mississippi where the shareholders of that corporation
might live." Clarke, supra note 7, at 375. The imposition of user charges is an alternative that
might solve the problem of the source of revenues used by a state to provide services. See note
520 and accompanying text infra. However, although it is called by a different name, the user
charge is a cost that would have the same economic effect on corporate earnings as a whole as
does the income tax on corporate earnings distributed as dividends that income tax integration
is designed to eliminate. Of course, the user charge shifts the economic burden from the user
of proportionately less state services to the user of proportionately greater state services. If the
argument that states do not need income tax integration is accepted, see note 289 and accom-
panying text supra, the user charge provides a means of avoiding the complexity caused by not
conforming to income tax integration at the federal level without impairing state revenues.
See note 520 and accompanying text mfna
346. Assume that Mississippi does so on its assumption that other states will tax residents
of Mississippi who are shareholders in corporations in those other states. Mississippi might not
structure its full integration in this manner.
greater taxation than the remainder of the net income.3 47 This prob-
lem is no different than the one that exists today, however, if the
shares of a corporation resident in Massachusetts with one Massa-
chusetts shareholder are owned by residents of Florida, where divi-
dends are not taxed.
The equity of the particular income tax system that a state uses
to collect the revenues which permit it to provide services must be
considered before a state can decide how to react to income tax inte-
gration at the federal level. These equity questions affect both the
state response to income tax integration at the federal level and the
manner in which that response is implemented, because the response




Income tax integration also presents the states with the problem
of administering a method of income taxation that adopts or rejects
income tax integration in the context of the federal relationship
among the states. The problems of tax administration in the federal
context arise if certain methods of integration are adopted at the fed-
eral level, regardless of whether the state adopts or rejects integra-
tion. Adoption of the split-rate, dividend deduction, or corporate tax
repeal methods of integration at the federal level presents adminis-
trative problems primarily for states that adopt integration.349
Some of the problems of tax administration raised by the adop-
tion of income tax integration at the federal level concern the federal
nature of modern business transactions. Shareholders are often resi-
dents of states other than those in which the corporation is resi-
dent.350 States must provide rules for shareholders who change their
state of residence during the taxable year. These provisions must
include rules for shareholders who change residence from a state
that has adopted integration to a state that has not adopted it, and
vice versa. Corporate reorganizations of multistate corporations
whose shareholders who are residents of several states, which may or
may not have adopted income tax integration, will require complex
technical rules for all except the split-rate method of integration.351
347. Moreover Massachusetts, for example, does not provide greater fire protection for the
portion of the warehouse of X Corporation that is attributable to the interest of the Massachu-
setts shareholder in X Corporation. See note 345 supra
348. The myriad ways in which these issues can arise become evident when the various
permutations of state reactions to income tax integration at the federal level are analyzed. See
notes 357-502 and accompanying text i/na
349. See notes 490-95, 502 and accompanying text n~fa.
350. See note 331 and accompanying text supra.
351. States that do not adopt integration also will be able to manage without many of
these special rules for corporate reorganizations if the method of integration adopted at the
Finally, states will need to administer records for nonresident share-
holders, a task that the state would not have to perform in the ab-
sence of income tax integration at the federal level.35
Other tax administration problems that are raised by income tax
integration and complicated by the federal relationship among the
states are extensions of the administrative problems faced by the
states in isolation.353 Under certain circumstances, for example,
states that reject integration need to make special adjustments to
their tax statutes and forms.354 The existence of nonresident corpo-
rations and shareholders increases the number of special adjust-
ments that are required.355 States that adopt integration face a series
of problems, also presented at the federal level, relating to tax-ex-
empt shareholders, part-year shareholders, audit adjustments, and
transition rules.356 These problems exist in greater proportions
within the context of the federal system.
VI. The State in a Federal System: The Response to Income
Tax Integration
A. Introduction
An analysis of the actions that states can take in response to the
adoption of income tax integration at the federal level, when consid-
ered in the context of the federal relationship among the states, is
quite complex. This section approaches the analysis through a series
of examples,3 57 based on the income tax systems of three states-
Florida, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Florida has no individual income
tax. In Pennsylvania, the corporate income tax base conforms to the
ftderal base and the individual income tax is computed indepen-
dently of the federal base. The corporate and individual income tax
bases of Ohio conform to the federal base.358 Special state constitu-
tional considerations in New York, 151 whose tax system is similar to
federal level and by the other states is the dividend deduction or corporate tax repeal method.
Nonetheless, even in these situations, the states not adopting integration will need rules for
determining basis.
352. See, e.g., McKessy, supra note 7, at 378. Under certain methods, states that reject
integration will not have this problem. See note 278 and accompanying text supra.
353. See notes 255-58, 276-79 and accompanying text supra.
354. See note 257 and accompanying text supra.
355. See notes 255-58 and accompanying text supra
356. See notes 282-86 and accompanying text supra.
357. These examples are generally not numerical, but more closely resemble a series of
fact patterns.
358. See notes 181, 191 and accompanying text supra The income tax systems in Illinois
and New York are similar to the Ohio system. If the differences significantly affect the analysis
of the fact patterns in this section, they will be noted.
359. The New York Constitution provides as follows:
Moneys,... securities and other intangible personal property within the state not
employed in carrying on any business therein by the owner shall be deemed to be
located in the domicile of the owner for purposes of taxation... . Intangible per-
that of Ohio, are discussed when relevant to the analysis of the Ohio-
type system.
The examples fall into four categories, 360 each of which focuses
on the responses of the primary state in light of the actions of the
secondary state.36' Each category is based on variations of the resi-
dence of the corporation and that of its shareholders. 362 The first
category is a corporation resident in the primary state with share-
holders who are residents of the secondary state. The second cate-
gory is a corporation resident in both the primary and secondary
states,363 and whose shareholders are residents of the secondary
state. The third category is a corporation resident in the secondary
state with shareholders who are residents of the primary state.364
The fourth category is a corporation resident in both the primary
and secondary states and whose shareholders are residents of the pri-
mary state.365
The analysis requires several assumptions. First, if a state
adopts integration, it adopts the method adopted at the federal level.
Second, there are no shareholders that are corporations. Although
this assumption ignores, to a degree, the realities of the situation, it
prevents the analysis from becoming so complicated that it hinders
useful examination of the issues. Third, the analysis assumes that
the method used by each state to allocate or apportion corporate in-
come among the states is one that avoids multiple taxation.3 66 This
sonal property shall not be taxed ad valorem nor shall any excise tax be levied solely
because of the ownership or possession thereof.
N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
360. A fifth category is the state in isolation, ie., when the corporation and its sharehold-
ers are residents of the primary state. See notes 230-329 and accompanying text supra:
361. These four categories, the six methods of integration, the three state income tax sys-
tems examined, and the three basic reactions of each state (adoption, rejection, and inaction),
form the basis for developing the permutations of fact patterns analyzed in this section.
362. See notes 178-79 and accompanying text supra. For purposes of simplicity, this sec-
tion does not analyze situations in which some of the shareholders are residents of one state
and other shareholders are residents of another state. To analyze this situation, it is necessary
to blend together in appropriate proportions the analyses of two or more relevant fact patterns.
363. As the definition of "resident" used in this article in relation to corporations indi-
cates, this occurs ifthe corporation does business in both states. See note 178 and accompany-
ing text jupra.
364. Although this category is a reversal of the first category, the point of view of the
primary state-the state which is analyzed in each category-changes depending on whether
its resident is a corporation or shareholder. In reality, a particular state would need to ex-
amine each category since all four situations exist simultaneously. See note 365 and accompa-
nying text infra
365. There are limitations to an analysis based on these four categories because each state
faces a combination of all four situations. Ohio, for example, has resident corporations with
Illinois shareholders; resident individuals owning stock in Illinois corporations; corporations
that do business in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois that have shareholders who are residents of
Ohio and Illinois, and so on. The analysis in this section can be adapted to these very complex
situations by blending together in appropriate proportions the analyses of two or more relevant
fact patterns.
366. For informative background analyses of the multiple taxation problem of multistate
corporations, see Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circum-
assumption also ignores reality but, like the prior assumption, it pre-
vents undue complication.367 The final assumption is that individu-
als who are nonresidents of a state have no income in or relationship
with that state, other than their ownership of stock in a corporation
resident in that state.
This chapter analyzes the actions that states can take in re-
sponse to the adoption of integration at the federal level and also
tests the proposition of the Carter Commission that uncoordinated
decision-making by the Canadian provinces on income tax integra-
tion would cause "an unsatisfactory state of affairs[,]. . . an endless




1. Corporation Resident in Primary State And Its Shareholders
Residents of Secondary State
(a) Primary state does nothing.-If full integration is adopted
at the federal level and the primary state--the state in which the
corporation is resident--does nothing in response to the adoption of
full integration, the state taxable income of the corporation will vir-
tually vanish. The effect on the corporation is the same as it is if the
corporation and its shareholders were residents of the primary state:
state corporate taxable income will be zero unless there are adjust-
ments to federal corporate taxable income that apply in the case.369
If full integration is adopted at the federal level, inaction by the
primary state affects the income tax treatment of nonresident share-
holders in various ways. In Florida and Pennsylvania, the nonresi-
dent shareholders would not be taxed.370 This result does not differ
from the result under current federal and state income tax law. In
Ohio, however, the nonresident shareholders will be required to in-
clude in taxable income that portion of their federal taxable incomes
that is properly allocable to Ohio.37' Ohio's statutory provisions for
allocating the income of a nonresident do not include rules for allo-
cating distributive shares of corporate net income. Arguably, the
distributive share is business income because it arises from transac-
seription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAx J. 487 (1968); Note, Developments in the Law.-
Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REv. 953 (1962).
367. Problems arising in the area of integration that are caused by multiple taxation would
be eliminated if multiple taxation is eliminated. This article does not address the elimination
of multiple taxation.
368. Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Report 197 (Ottawa 1966). See note 155 and ac-
companying text supr,
369. See notes 184-87 and accompanying text supra,
370. See notes 189, 207 and accompanying text supra.
371. Osno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5747.01(A), 5747.05(A), 5747.05(B) (Page 1973 & Supp.
1975).
tions and activities in the regular course of business;3 72 therefore, it
should be apportioned under the three-factor formula.373 In this
case, the distributive share would be apportioned entirely to Ohio.374
The alternative argument-that the distributive share is a dividend
and thus should not be allocated to Ohio37 5-is not as persuasive
since the distributive share includes undistributed corporate net in-
come. 376 In either case, Ohio will need to clarify the matter by
amending its tax law.377
(b) Primary state rejects integration.-If full integration is
adopted at the federal level and the primary state rejects integra-
tion,378 the tax treatment of the resident corporation and its nonresi-
dent shareholders by the primary state will continue as under current
law.
379
(c) Primary state adopts integration--Ohio asprimary state.-If
full integration is adopted both at the federal level and in Ohio, an
interesting constitutional question arises concerning the treatment of
the nonresident shareholder s.3 8  The issue is whether Ohio may tax
nonresident shareholders on their shares of the net income of the
Ohio corporation without violating the commerce or due process
clauses of the federal constitution.38 ' The commerce clause prohibits
states from imposing a tax that impedes interstate commerce.382 The
shift of the tax from the corporation to its nonresident shareholders
probably would not impede interstate commerce because that shift
would not impair the ability of the shareholders or corporation to
function. 38 3
372. Id § 5747.01(B).
373. Id § 5747.21.
374. This result is based on the assumption that the corporation is resident in Ohio.
375. OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 5747.20(B)(5) (Page Supp. 1975).
376. This is especially true if few or no dividends have been distributed by the
corporation.
377. States that require nonresident shareholders of Subchapter S corporations to include
in taxable income all or a portion of their distributive shares of the corporate net income, see
notes 523-31 and accompanying text infra, can resolve the issue by analogy more easily than
Ohio. See notes 395-405 and accompanying text in-fra
378. See notes 290-96 and accompanying text supra.
379. The corporation might transfer its business to the secondary state if that state adopts
income tax integration. Of course, nontax factors may have required the nonresident share-
holders to do business in the primary state and in corporate form. If the corporate income tax
burden is sufficiently great, however, integration might become a principal factor.
380. In New York, full integration might not be possible without a state constitutional
amendment. See notes 263-72 and accompanying text supra If the constitution is so amended
or if Garlin v. Murphy, 51 Misc. 2d 477, 273 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966), is extended to apply to full
integration, the textual material concerning Ohio is relevant to New York.
381. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
382. See Hellerstein, supra note 366; Note, supra note 366.
383. Unless the corporation withholds, see notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra, tax-
payers might argue that the lack of shareholder liquidity impedes their investment in interstate
commerce. This argument is weak, however, since many shareholders will not have liquidity
problems. From an economic standpoint, full integration does not change the position of the
The due process clause prevents a state from enforcing a tax
beyond its jurisdiction and from imposing a tax on persons or things
with only tangential relationships to the state.384 The due process
limitation is also unlikely to prevent the imposition of an Ohio in-
come tax on the shares of the corporate net income that are attribu-
table to nonresident shareholders. A jurisdictional basis for taxation
of income of a nonresident clearly exists if the source of that in-
come 38 5 is from within that state, whether the income arises by virtue
of business situs or business activities.386 Although the corporation,
not the nonresident shareholders, has the property and activities in
Ohio that create the jurisdictional basis for taxation, it is difficult to
argue that this difference is sufficient to remove jurisdiction to tax
since no successful constitutional objections have been sustained
against state tax laws that tax nonresident beneficiaries of a resident
trust or estate,387 nonresident limited partners in a resident limited
partnership,388 or nonresident shareholders of a resident Subchapter
S corporation. 389 Thus, Ohio will require nonresident shareholders
to file income tax returns and pay tax on their shares of the net in-
come of the corporation.390
Under full integration, the income tax treatment by Ohio of the
nonresident shareholders raises some problems for the state in which
the shareholders are resident, since the need may arise for a tax
credit for taxes paid to Ohio.39'
(d) Primary state adopts integration--Pennsylvania as primary
state.-If full integration is adopted both at the federal level and in
shareholders because they receive the same or greater after-tax income. The Supreme Court,
however, does not give great weight to that aspect of the problem. See Note, supra note 366, at
956. Finally, to the extent that the proponents of income tax integration are correct in their
assertion that it will help the national economy, full integration should stimulate interstate
commerce.
384. See Note, supra note 366, at 961-62 & n.37.
385. This article does not discuss whether undistributed corporate net income is income
realized within the constitutional meaning of realization set forth in Eisner v. MacComber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920). See Gabinet & Coffey, supra note I.
386. See Note, supra note 366.
387. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.23 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1975).
388: See, e.g., Chapman v. Browne, 268 App. Div. 806, 48 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1944). The
argument that a partnership is a nonentity and the partner is the actual taxpayer is weak when
one considers the true relationship of a limited partner to a limited partnership.
389. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 183 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1971). The
elective nature of the Subchapter S corporation should not be of much significance to the
jurisdiction problem because the election is a federal election and should not be considered the
basis for current state taxation of nonresident shareholders of Subchapter S corporations.
390. The Ohio provision that permits a partnership under certain circumstances to file a
single return on behalf of its nonresident partners provides an approach to solving certain
administrative problems. See note 81 and accompanying text supra; notes 521-32 and accom-
panying text infra
391. This question is explored more fully in connection with the third category, in which
the shareholders are resident in the primary state and the corporation is resident in the secon-
dary state. See notes 407-24 and accompanying text infra.
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania must resolve the same questions as
Ohio. The inability of a partner in Pennsylvania to take into account
distributive shares of partnership losses, other than to offset partner-
ship gains, however, is an interesting gloss on the problem. 392 The
nonresident shareholder, like the nonresident partner, will not be
permitted to use a distributive share of a corporate loss to offset com-
pensation, interest, or other income received from the corporation.
It does not appear, however, that the shareholder would be in any
worse a position than under current law.
(e) Primary state adopts integration-Florida as primary
state.-Although integration effectively exists in Florida because
shareholders are not taxed, Florida might decide to follow the fed-
eral system and transfer the imposition of the income tax from the
corporation to its shareholders. The shareholder tax would resemble
a partial income tax. Florida would then encounter the same ques-
tions as Ohio. If, on the other hand, Florida adopts integration by
maintaining its current income tax system, neither resident nor non-
resident shareholders would be subject to income tax.
2. Corporation Resident in Primary and Secondary States And Its
Shareholders Resident in Secondary State
(a) Primary state does nothing.-If full integration is adopted
at the federal level and the primary state-one of two states in which
the corporation is resident-does nothing in response to the adoption
of full integration, the outcome will be the same as if the corporation
were resident only in the primary state. The federal constitution,
however, does not permit the primary state to impose a tax on the
nonresident shareholders' portion of the distributive share that is ap-
portionable to the secondary state. Thus, the interpretation
problems regarding allocation of distributive shares393 must be re-
solved in a manner that is consistent with those constitutional
limitations.
(b) Primary state rejects integration.-If full integration is
adopted at the federal level and the primary state rejects integration,
the tax treatment of the corporation and its nonresident shareholders
by the primary state will continue as under current law.394
(c) Primary state adopts integration.-If full integration is
adopted both at the federal level and in the primary state, a question
392. See note 83 supra
393. See notes 372-77 and accompanying text supra.
394. See note 379 supra
arises in addition to those that arise when the corporation is resident
only in the primary state. The question involves the manner in
which the primary state determines the portion of the distributive
share of the nonresident shareholder that is allocable to the primary
state.395 The primary state must determine whether it will treat the
distributive share of the nonresident shareholder as a dividend,396 as
business income,397 or as the distributive share of a nonresident part-
ner of a resident partnership.
398
Very few clues exist in the current treatment of entities taxed at
the shareholder level 399 to suggest what the primary state would de-
cide. Since Ohio and Pennsylvania treat Subchapter S corporations
as they do any other corporation, no analogy can be drawn for those
states. New York does not tax nonresident shareholders of Sub-
chapter S corporations. This approach resembles its tax treatment of
dividends received by nonresidents from resident corporations,4°°
but it is not a beneficial approach under full integration because of
potential revenue loss.40' Such an approach would, however, be ad-
ministratively acceptable. Certain states that tax nonresident share-
holders of Subchapter S corporations4° z resolve the problem by
requiring the nonresident shareholder to pay tax on the part of the
distributive share derived from sources within the state. °3
Since full integration is conceptually a partnership approach to
the taxation of corporations, Ohio is likely to determine the portion
of the distributive share of the nonresident shareholder that is prop-
erly allocable to Ohio as it determines the allocation of the distribu-
tive share of a nonresidentpartner. Alternatively, Ohio could follow
the approach of the states that require nonresident shareholders of
Subchapter S corporations to include in state taxable income the
portion of their distributive shares that are allocable to the state.
The partnership treatment differs from the treatment of the distribu-
395. This issue is analogous to the one that arises if the primary state does nothing. See
notes 372-77 and accompanying text supra The difference is that in the situation described in
the text the state has a choice. In the situation that arises if the primary state does nothing, the
issue is resolved by existing state law.
396. See, e.g., note 375 and accompanying text supra
397. See, e.g., notes 372-73 and accompanying text supra
398. See notes 67-73, 74-76, 86-87 and accompanying text supra
399. See notes 64-145 and accompanying text supra
400. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 3-301(c)(2)(A) (Smith-Hurd 1974); PA. TAX REG.
§ 301(k)-1(4)(b), I PA. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 1 19-518.
401. The interstate revenue loss that a state incurs if it follows the federal Subchapter S
election is relatively small, because only a small percentage of corporations are Subchapter S
corporations, and most of those are intrastate enterprises. For example, in 1977, of the
2,241,317 federal income tax returns filed by corporations, only 429,187 (19.1%) were filed by
Subchapter S corporations. Of the $4.1 trillion in receipts reported by corporations, only
$163.7 billibn (3.9%) were received by Subehapter S corporations. IRS- 1977 CORPORATION
INCOME TAX STATISTICS, supra note 187 at 9, 23.
402. See notes 521-31 and accompanying text in9,a
403. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.181(5) (Vernon 1976).
tive share entirely as business income in only one respect. Under the
partnership approach, the items of corporate net income that are
subject to specific allocation rules are allocated in the hands of the
shareholders under those rules, and not as business income at the
corporate level."' The result under the partnership approach is the
same as when the entire corporate income is both allocated and ap-




When shareholders are nonresidents of Florida and the corpo-
ration is a resident of Florida and is also present in another state, the
analysis is the same as if the corporation were a resident only of
Florida.' If Florida institutes a partial shareholder income tax, it
will encounter the same questions as Ohio and Pennsylvania. If
Florida continues its present system, neither nonresident sharehold-
ers nor resident shareholders will be subject to income tax.
3. Corporation Resident in Secondary State And Its Shareholders
Resident in Primary State
(a) Primary state does nothing.-If full integration is adopted
at the federal level and the primary state--the state in which the
shareholders are resident-does nothing in response to the adoption
of full integration, the effect of full integration depends not only on
the particularities of the state tax system, but also on the response of
the secondary state to full integration.
(b) Primary and secondary states do nothing-Ohio as primary
state.-If Ohio is the primary state and both it and the secondary
state do nothing, the effect of full integration depends on the identity
of the secondary state. If the secondary state is Florida or Penn-
sylvania, the residents of Ohio who are shareholders in the Florida
or Pennsylvania corporation will not be taxed by Florida or Penn-
sylvania, but they will include their distributive shares of the net in-
come of the Florida or Pennsylvania corporation in their Ohio
individual incomes. This poses no problems for Ohio in addition to
those already discussed.4 7
The secondary state may be like Illinois, which has an income
tax system similar to the Ohio system. In this case, Illinois might or
might not tax Ohio residents who are shareholders in the Illinois cor-
poration on their distributive shares of the net income of the corpo-
ration. Taxation is determined by the interpretation of the
provisions of the Illinois or Ohio tax law relating to the allocation of
404. See notes 372-73 and accompanying text supra
405. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5747.20 (Page Supp. 1975).
406. See note 393 and accompanying text supra,
407. See notes 230-89, 369-406 and accompanying text supra.
these distributive shares of nonresidents. 40 8 No problem arises if the
net effect of the interpretation is that Illinois does not tax the distrib-
utive shares. Alternatively, if Illinois does tax those distributive
shares, Ohio shareholders can claim a credit against their Ohio in-
come taxes for the tax imposed by Illinois, 40 9 and revenues shift from
Ohio to Illinois.
(c) Primary and secondary state do nothing-Pennsylvania as
primary state.-If both Pennsylvania, as the primary state, and the
secondary state do nothing, the identity of the secondary state deter-
mines the effect of full integration. If the secondary state is Florida
or a state with an income tax system similar to that in Pennsylvania,
such as North Carolina, the residents of Pennsylvania who are share-
holders in the Florida or North Carolina corporation will not be
taxed by Florida or North Carolina. These shareholders will be re-
quired to include only dividends received from the corporation in
their Pennsylvania individual incomes,41° a procedure that does not
differ from the current situation.
If the secondary state is Ohio, the result is the same as if Ohio
were the primary state,41' except that the Pennsylvania individual
incomes of the shareholders include only the dividends paid by the
corporation and the tax credit is limited to the Ohio income tax at-
tributable to those dividends.41 ' Thus, the undistributed portion of
the distributive net income of the corporation will be taxed only by
Ohio. When it is later distributed as a dividend, it will be included
in Pennsylvania individual income. Since the shareholder at that
time should be able to claim a credit for the Ohio income tax im-
posed on the dividend,4 13 however, revenue shifts from Pennsylvania
to Ohio.
(d) Primary and secondary state do nothing--orida as primary
state.-If neither Florida, as the primary state, nor the secondary
state do anything, the effect of full integration will vary. If inaction
by the secondary state does not result in taxation by that state of the
distributive shares of corporate net income of nonresident sharehold-
ers,4 1 4 there will be no effect. If the inaction by the secondary state
results in taxation by that state of nonresident shareholders' divi-
408. See notes 372-77 and accompanying text supra
409. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.05(B) (Page 1973).
410. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
411. See notes 408-09 and accompanying text supra.
412. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
413. Problems will arise in determining which portion of the corporate net income taxed
by Ohio is distributed as a dividend. Rules similar to those for determining earnings and
profits at the federal level might be needed. See I.R.C. §§ 312, 316. A very narrow interpreta-
tion of the Pennsylvania tax law providing credits for taxes paid to other states would deny any
credit to the shareholders.
414. This would occur in a state with an income tax system similar to the systems in
Florida or Pennsylvania, or a state with an income tax system similar to the system in Ohio, if
dends and undistributed corporate net income,4 15 Florida sharehold-
ers will pay individual income tax to the secondary state without
having a Florida income tax liability against which to credit that tax.
(e) Primary state does nothing--secondary state rejects integra-
tion.-If the secondary state rejects full integration, it will not tax
the primary state shareholders on their interests in the secondary
state corporation. This result is no different than under current law.
(t) Primary state does nothing-secondary state adopts integra-
tion.-If the secondary state adopts full integration,41 6 the effects on
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, and their resident shareholders are the
same as if those three states were primary states, with Ohio as the
secondary state that does nothing in response to full integration, but
interprets its tax laws concerning allocation of the distributive net
income attributable to a nonresident shareholder such that it re-
quires a nonresident shareholder to pay an Ohio income tax on that
distributive share.4 17
(g) Primary state rejects integration.-If full integration is
adopted at the federal level and the primary state--the state in which
the shareholders are resident-rejects full integration, the effect de-
pends on the response of the secondary state to full integration. If
the secondary state, by action or inaction, does not tax the undistrib-
uted net income attributable to a nonresident shareholder,41 8 no ef-
fect will occur. The tax results will be the same as under current law.
If the secondary state taxes the full distributive share of the corpo-
rate net income attributable to a nonresident shareholder, 41 9 a credit
problem arises. The primary state generally permits a credit against
its income tax only for taxes paid to another state on income also
taxed by the primary state.42 ° The primary state shareholders, there-
fore, will be unable to claim a credit for the taxes paid to the secon-
dary state on the undistributed portion of their distributive shares of
the corporate net income until that portion of the income is distrib-
the state interprets its allocation provisions to treat the distributive share of corporate net in-
come as a dividend.
415. This would occur in a state with an income tax system similar to the Ohio system if
the state interprets its allocation provisions to treat the distributive share of corporate net in-
come as business income.
416. An exception to this example would be Florida "adopting" integration by doing
nothing in response to the adoption of integration at the federal level. See note 393 and ac-
companying text supra,
417. See notes 409, 411-13, 415 and accompanying text supra.
418. This would occur in a state that rejects integration or a state described in note 414
supra.
419. An example would be a state that adopts integration. But see notes 415 & 416 supra
420. See, e.g., 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
uted as a dividend.421
(h) Primary state adopts integration.-If full integration is
adopted at the federal level and the primary state adopts full integra-
tion,422 the effect is determined by the response of the secondary
state to full integration. If the secondary state does not tax the un-
distributed net income attributable to a nonresident shareholder,423
no effect occurs since the tax results will be the same as under cur-
rent law. If the secondary state taxes the full distributive share of the
corporate net income attributable to the nonresident shareholder,424
the primary state shareholders will claim a credit against their pri-
mary state income tax liabilities for the income taxes paid to the sec-
ondary state on their distributive shares of the corporate net income.
4. Corporation Resident in Primary and Secondary States And
Its Shareholders Resident in Primary State.-Adoption of full inte-
gration at the federal level complicates the issue that arises when the
corporation is a resident only in the secondary state with the ques-
tion of how to allocate and apportion the corporate income. A series
of issues also arises concerning the availability or measure of tax
credits for income taxes paid to other states.
If both the primary and secondary states do not tax the share-
holders on the undistributed net income of the corporation,425 the
tax results and allocation problems will be no different than under
current law.
If the secondary state426 does not tax shareholders on the undis-
tributed net income of the corporation, but the primary state does,
4 27
a problem arises. The primary state will tax shareholders who are
residents in the primary state on their shares of the entire net income
of the corporation.428 If, however, the secondary state taxes the por-
tion of the corporation's net income properly allocable to the secon-
dary state,429 the shareholders in the primary state will be unable to
claim that tax as a credit against their primary state income tax lia-
bilities. To this extent, a portion of the net income of the corporation
will be subject to double taxation.430 If the secondary state, by its
421. See notes 411-13 supra for a similar fact pattern.
422. But see note 416 supra
423. See note 418 supra
424. See note 419 supra.
425. See note 418 supra
426. Id An analysis based on these four categories is limited because each state en-
counters a combination of all four.
427. See note 419 supra
428. A state has jurisdiction to tax its residents on all income no matter what the source.
429. Allocation problems identical to those under current law exist.
430. If the primary state is concerned with this result, it can adopt a pass-through credit
system. See I.R.C. § 902.
inaction, taxes neither the corporation nor its shareholders on the
portion of the corporate net income properly allocable to the secon-
dary state, no special problems are created for the primary state.43 1
An interesting issue arises if the primary state432 does not tax
shareholders on the undistributed net income of the corporation
while the secondary state does. 33 The secondary state will tax the
shareholders who are residents in the primary state on the portion of
their shares of the corporate net income that is properly allocable to
the secondary state.434 If, however, the primary state, by its inac-
tion,435 taxes neither the corporation nor its shareholders on corpo-
rate net income, the shareholders resident in the primary state will
be unable to claim a credit for the income taxes they pay to the sec-
ondary state. This results from a limitation in most state tax laws
permitting the credit only for income taxed in both states.436 The
result is undesirable from the perspective of the primary state be-
cause under current law, only the primary state would tax the share-
holders' portions of the corporate income distributed as dividends.437
If the primary state taxes the portion of the corporation's net income
properly allocable to the primary state,438 no problem arises because
each state taxes the income properly allocable to it, one in the hands
of the corporation and the other in the hands of the shareholders.
Two problems arise if the primary state also taxes resident
shareholders on dividends received from the corporation. One is the
double taxation of the portion of corporate net income allocable to
the primary state. This result, however, is not a problem from the
perspective of the primary state because it is an intended result. The
second problem is a complication in the computation of the credit
for income taxes paid to other states. Since the shareholders resident
in the primary state are taxed on all dividends from the corpora-
tion,439 they will seek a credit for the taxes paid to the secondary
state on the portion of the corporate net income allocable to the sec-
ondary state.' The dilemma is whether the distributive share taxed
by the secondary state is income also subject to taxation by the pri-
mary state within the meaning of the credit provision."' The situa-
431. The double taxation problem does not exist in this situation.
432. See note 418 supra
433. See note 419 supra
434. See also notes 394-400 and accompanying text supra
435. An example would be a state with an income tax system similar to that in Florida or
Pennsylvania.
436. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.05(B)(1) (Page 1973).
437. Under current law, states do not tax dividends paid to nonresidents. Dividends are
therefore taxed by the home state of the shareholders. See note 400 supra
438. See note 429 supra
439. See note 428 supra
440. See note 419 and accompanying text supra.
441. See note 436 and accompanying text supra.
tion is further complicated if the dividend is paid in a taxable year
subsequent to the year in which the secondary state taxes the corpo-
rate net income from which it is paid. A narrow interpretation of the
tax credit provision would deny the credit and cause double taxation
of the corporate net income allocable to the secondary state." 2 A
broader interpretation of the tax credit provision would permit the
credit.
If both the primary and secondary states tax shareholders with
respect to distributed and undistributed net income of the corpora-
tion," 3 no serious problem arises. The primary state will tax resi-
dent shareholders on their shares of the entire corporate net
income, 4 " but will allow a tax credit for the taxes paid by the share-
holders to the secondary state on their shares of the corporate net
income properly allocable to the secondary state.445
C. Dividend Credit
L Corporation Resident in Primary State And Its Shareholders
Residents of Secondary State.
(a) Primary state does nothing. -If the dividend credit method
of integration is adopted at the federal level and the primary state-
the state in which the corporation is resident-does nothing in re-
sponse, several issues arise.
If the primary state is Ohio, the nonresident shareholder is not
required to include the dividend in Ohio taxable income." 6 A ques-
tion arises, however, on the allocation of the federal corporate in-
come tax attributable to the dividend that the shareholder has
included in federal taxable income.447 If the state tax law is inter-
preted to allocate the federal corporate income tax to sources outside
Ohio, the result is no different than under current law.448 A contrary
interpretation results if Ohio taxes the nonresident shareholder on
the federal corporate income tax included in income. This raises
problems for the secondary state, which are discussed in connection
with the third category, in which the shareholders are residents of
the primary state.4 9
442. The primary state might intend this result. It impedes, however, the attempt of the
secondary state to eliminate double taxation of corporate earnings distributed as dividends.
443. See notes 422-24 and accompanying text supra for an illustrative case.
444. See note 428 jupra
445. See notes 424-25 and accompanying text supra
446. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.20(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1975).
447. See notes 206-08 and accompanying text supra The issue is moot if the federal
"gross-up" provisions are placed in section 78 of the Internal Revenue Code and the state tax
law presently excludes the section 78 "gross-up" from state taxable income. See note 203
supra
448. See note 437 supra
449. See notes 469-89 and accompanying text bnfra.
With Pennsylvania as the primary state, the result is the same as
under present law because the nonresident shareholder is not re-
quired to include the dividend in Pennsylvania taxable income.
450
The issue concerning the federal corporate income tax included in
shareholder incomedoes not arise because Pennsylvania taxable in-
come is computed independently of the federal base.
If the primary state is Florida, no problems arise because Flor-
ida has no individual income tax.
(b) Primary state rejects integration. -Adoption of the divi-
dend credit method of integration at the federal level and the pri-
mary state's rejection of integration causes no change in the taxation
of the resident corporation and its nonresident shareholders. Their
tax treatment will continue as under current law in the primary
state.45 l
(c) Primary state adopts integration.-Adoption of the divi-
dend credit method of integration at the federal level and in the pri-
mary state creates an interesting constitutional question concerning
the treatment of the nonresident shareholder.4 2  The issue is
whether primary state taxation of nonresident shareholders with re-
spect to dividends received from corporations resident in the primary
state violates the commerce and due process clauses of the federal
constitution.45 3 Although contrary arguments can be advanced,45 4
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. .J C.
Penney Co. 455 and International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Taxation456 indicate that the primary state may tax nonresi-
dent shareholders on dividends attributable to corporate net income
arising from sources within the primary state.45 7 The J C. Penney
450. See note 400 supra.
451. See note 379 supra
452. In New York, the constitution might prevent taxation of the nonresident shareholder.
See Letter from James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of New
York, to James E. Maule (January 11, 1978) at 4 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law),
concerning section 3 of article XVI of the New York Constitution, the relevant text of which
appears in note 359 supra
453. See notes 381-82, 384 and accompanying text supra
454. Penniman & Heller, State Income Tax Administration 27 (1959) (no authority cited).
But see Note, Multistate Taxation of Personal Income, 11l U. PA. L. REv. 974 (1963).
455. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
456. 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
457. The Court in International larvester stated,
In taxing such distributions [of corporate earnings], Wisconsin may impose the bur-
den of the tax either upon the corporation or upon the stockholders who derive the
ultimate benefit from the corporation's Wisconsin activities. Personal presence
within the state of the stockholder-taxpayers is not essential to the constitutional levy
of a tax taken out of so much of the corporation's Wisconsin earnings as is distributed
to them. A state may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is fairly attrib-
utable either to property located in the state or to events or transactions which, occur-
ring there, are subject to state regulation and which are within the protection of the
state and entitled to the numerous other benefits which it confers. And the privilege
and International Harvester decisions concerned the same state tax
on the corporation, which was measured as a percentage of divi-
dends paid. In both cases, the Supreme Court reiterated the ration-
ale of Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. v. United States:45 "[W]here the
earnings of a Wisconsin corporation doing business solely in Wis-
consin are the source of the dividends, the State's power to tax their
transfer and impose that tax upon the stockholder cannot be
doubted."459
Since the constitutional questions should be resolved in favor of
the primary state, that state must decide whether it will continue
nontaxation of nonresident shareholders on the dividends from the
primary state corporation, or whether it will tax the nonresident
shareholder and permit a credit for the state corporate income tax
attributable to the dividend.46° The latter approach alleviates double
taxation of the corporate net income. The former approach also al-
lieviates double taxation unless the secondary state taxes the nonresi-
dent shareholders on the dividend from the primary state
corporation without providing a credit."'
2. Corporation Resident in Primary and Secondary States And Its
Shareholders Resident in Secondary State
(a) Primary state does nothing. -If the dividend credit method
of integration is adopted at the federal level and the primary state-
one of two states in which the corporation is resident--does nothing
in response, the issues presented are the same as in the situations in
which the corporation is resident in the primary, but not secondary,
state.4' 2
(b) Primary state rejects integration.-If the federal govern-
ment adopts the dividend credit method of integration and the pri-
of receiving dividends derived from corporate activities within the state can have no
greater immunity than the privilege of receiving any other income from sources lo-
cated there.
We think that Wisconsin may constitutionally tax the Wisconsin earnings dis-
tributed as dividends to the stockholders.
322 U.S. at 441-42.
458. 322 U.S. 526 (1944).
459. Id at 530-31. All three decisions might be distinguishable because the corporation,
not the shareholders, was required to file a return and remit the tax withheld from the distrib-
uted dividends. Dicta in the cases indicate that such a distinction is tenuous. Moreover, states
might determine that it is administratively advantageous to require corporations to withhold
under a dividend credit method of integration.
460. In either event, Ohio must take steps to remove from the taxable income of the share-
holders the federal corporate taxable income otherwise included therein. See notes 301-02 and
accompanying text supra
461. No problem occurs if the secondary state is Florida. The credit might not be of much
use to the shareholders if their income tax liabilities to the primary state are less than their
income tax liabilities to the secondary state.
462. See notes 446-50 and accompanying text supra.
mary state proceeds to reject integration, the tax treatment of the
corporation and its nonresident shareholders from the perspective of
the primary state will continue as under current law. 63
(c) Primary state adopts integration.-If the dividend credit
method of integration is adopted both at the federal level and in the
primary state, several questions arise in addition to the issues con-
cerning treatment of the nonresident shareholder when the corpora-
tion is resident in the primary, but not secondary, state. The issues
arise if the primary state decides to tax the nonresident shareholder
on the dividend from the corporation and permit a credit for the
state corporate income tax attributable to the dividend. First, the
primary state must decide how it will determine the portion of the
dividend that is attributable to corporate net income from sources
within the primary state. 4" Presumably, the allocation would con-
form to the allocation used by the corporation in determining its in-
come tax liability to the primary state,465 although this approach is
not without complications. ' 6 Second, the primary state must decide
how it will determine the portion of state corporate income tax that
is attributable to the dividend paid to the nonresident shareholder
and subject to income taxation by the primary state." 7 In all likeli-
hood, the state corporate income tax included in the income of the
nonresident shareholder, and subsequently allowed as a credit, will
be the tax paid on the income of the corporation from which the
dividend taxed by the state is paid.4"
3. Corporation Resident in Secondary State and Its Shareholders
Resident in Primary State
(a) Primary state does nothing. -If the federal government
adopts the dividend credit method of integration and the primary
463. See note 379 supra
464. The federal constitution limits taxation by the primary state of the portion of the
corporate net income attributable to income from sources within the secondary state. See text
accompanying note 393 supra.
465. The formula might be as follows:
Portion of Corporate net income from
dividend taxed - Dividend x sources within primary state
by primary
state Total corporate net income
466. If more than one taxable year is involved there must be a complicated tracing of
sources of corporate net income and application of the formula in note 465 supra to each
particular year. See note 413 upra.
467. The amount of state corporate income tax so determined is included in the state
taxable income of the nonresident shareholder and allowed as a credit against the tax liability
of the shareholder.
468. See notes 465-66 supra Special rules would be needed to determine the state corpo-
rate income tax attributable to the dividend if the dividend is paid from the earnings of more
than one taxable year.
state does nothing in response, the effect of integration depends not
only on the identity of the state, but on the response of the secondary
state to the dividend credit method of integration.
(b) Primary and secondary states do nothing-Ohio as primary
state.-If both Ohio, as the primary state, and the secondary state do
nothing, the effect of the dividend credit method of integration de-
pends on the identity of the secondary state. If the secondary state is
Florida, the residents of Ohio who are shareholders in the Florida
corporation will not be taxed by Florida, but will include the divi-
dend and federal corporate income tax attributable to the dividend
in their Ohio individual incomes." 9 This does not pose any
problems for Ohio in addition to those already discussed. 70
If the secondary state is Pennsylvania, the residents of Ohio who
are shareholders in the Pennsylvania corporation will not be taxed
by Pennsylvania, and no special problems are caused for Ohio. If
the secondary state is a state with an income tax system similar to
Ohio's, such as Illinois, the residents of Ohio who are shareholders in
the Illinois corporation may or may not be taxed by Illinois on the
federal corporate income tax included in the income of the share-
holders. 7' If Illinois does not tax the federal corporate income tax,
no problem arises. If Illinois taxes the federal corporate income tax,
however, the Ohio shareholders will claim a credit for the taxes paid
to Illinois if Ohio also taxes the federal corporate income tax. If
Ohio does not tax the federal tax, Ohio taxpayers do not claim a
credit,472 but they will pay income taxes to Illinois on ownership of
an Illinois corporation that they do not pay under current law.473
(c) Primary and secondary state do nothing-Pennsylvania or
Florida as primary state. -If either Pennsylvania or Florida is the
primary state and neither the primary nor the secondary state re-
sponds, the effect of the dividend credit method of integration differs
from the effect under current law in one aspect. If the secondary
state is Ohio and it interprets its tax law to require the Pennsylvania
or Florida shareholders to pay Ohio income tax on the federal cor-
porate income tax included in federal taxable income, Pennsylvania
shareholders will not be able to credit the Ohio tax against their
Pennsylvania tax liabilities. Florida shareholders will have no Flor-
ida income tax liability against which to credit that tax. Both Penn-
sylvania and Florida shareholders will, however, be paying income
469. See notes 205-08 and accompanying text supra
470. See notes 446-49 and accompanying text supra.
471. See notes 446-49 and accompanying text supra.
472. A state permits a credit only for income taxed both by it and by the state that imposes
the income tax. See note 420 and accompanying text supra
473. The tax is unintended and accidental and, for that reason, probably is not justifiable.
taxes to Ohio for ownership of an Ohio corporation. They do not
pay these taxes under current law.474
(d) Primary State does nothing-Secondary state rejects integra-
tion.-The primary state shareholders will not be taxed on interests
in the secondary state corporation if the secondary state rejects the
dividend credit method. This result is the same as under current
law.
(e) Primary state does nothing-Secondary state adopts integra-
tion.- If the secondary state adopts the dividend credit method of
integration, the primary state and its resident shareholders are af-
fected in several ways. The primary state need not act if the secon-
dary state decides not to tax nonresident shareholders' corporate
dividends.475 If the secondary state taxes nonresident shareholders'
dividends from the corporation, the effect depends on the identity of
the primary state.
If the primary state is Florida, the result is that resident share-
holders pay to the secondary state a tax that they do not pay under
current law.4 76
If the primary state is Pennsylvania, it must resolve a compli-
cated tax credit issue. The tax credit that Pennsylvania residents can
claim is the portion of the tax paid to the secondary state on the
dividend.477 One aspect of the problem is that part of the secondary
state tax liability of the Pennsylvania shareholder involves the inclu-
sion of the corporate state income tax liability in income. The sec-
ond aspect of the problem concerns the allocation of the secondary
state dividend credit liability of the Pennsylvania shareholder on the
dividend to the secondary state.478
If the primary state is Ohio, it faces the same problems as Penn-
474. See note 473 supra.
475. See note 460 supra.
476. This does not occur if in the secondary state the state dividend credit of the share-
holder exceeds the state income tax liability of the shareholder on the dividend and the state
dividend credit.
477. See note 420 and accompanying text supra
478. For example, assume the corporation has one shareholder and is taxed by the secon-
dary state at a five percent rate. The corporation has $200 of income before federal tax liabil-
ity, and thus pays $10 of state income tax. The corporation pays a $100 dividend to the
Pennsylvania shareholder. The secondary state taxes the Pennsylvania shareholder on $105
($100 plus $5 corporate tax attributable to dividend), at a rate of six percent for a tax liability
of $1.30 ($6.30 less $5 corporate tax). Pennsylvania taxes the shareholder on the $100 divi-
dend. The issue is whether the credit should be $1.30 (actual tax paid to secondary state),
$6.00 (secondary state tax on the dividend ignoring dividend credit, i.e., 6% of $100), or $5.95
(the $6.00 tax less 100/105 of the $5.00 dividend credit). Presumably it should be $1.30, but
this is not an evident result. This ignores the fact that in the absence of the dividend credit
method of integration the secondary state would not have taxed the Pennsylvania shareholder.
In any event, Pennsylvania legislators and tax administrators probably will not appreciate
the complexity added to its tax law and forms as a result of the actions of another state.
sylvania, in addition to the question of whether the federal corporate
income tax included in Ohio taxable income of the shareholder is
subject to income taxation.479
0 Primary state rejects integration.-If the dividend credit
method of integration is adopted at the federal level and the primary
state-the state in which the shareholders are resident-rejects inte-
gration, the response of the secondary state determines the effect of
the dividend credit method of integration. If the secondary state
does not provide for a dividend credit method of integration,480 the
tax results will be the same as under current law. If the secondary
state, by its inaction, taxes the federal corporate income tax included
in the federal taxable income of the shareholder, the effect will be the
same as when Ohio, as the secondary state, interprets its tax laws to
produce the result.48' If the secondary state adopts a dividend credit
method of integration, the effect for Ohio and Pennsylvania is the
same as that described when Pennsylvania does nothing and the sec-
ondary state adopts a dividend credit method of integration.482
Since Florida does not have an individual income tax, these effects
will not occur in Florida, but the tax liabilities of its shareholders to
the secondary state will be altered.48 3
(g) Primary state adopts integration.-Adoption of the divi-
dend credit method of integration at the federal level only by the
primary state can produce several results, depending upon the re-
sponse of the secondary state. If the secondary state does not adopt a
dividend credit method of integration, 4  there is no effect on the
primary state unless the secondary state is Ohio and it taxes the fed-
eral corporate income tax included in the federal taxable income of
the shareholder.485 If the secondary state adopts a dividend credit
method of integration and decides to tax nonresident shareholders'
dividends,48 6 the result will be a complication of the state income tax
credit for taxes paid to another state. 8 7
479, See notes 447-49 and accompanying text supra;
480. This would occur in states with income tax systems similar to those in Pennsylvania
or Florida.
481. See notes 471-74 and accompanying text supra There will be one simplification in
the fact pattern described at text accompanying note 473 supra, because one of the states with
an income tax system similar to Ohio's will not tax the federal corporate income tax attributa-
ble to the dividend and, thus, there will be no credit for taxes paid to another state.
482. See notes 477-78 and accompanying text supra.
483. Whether there is an increase or decrease depends on the relation of the income tax
rates of the corporation and the rates of its shareholders.
484. An example would be a state that rejects integration or a state described in note 480
upra
485. See notes 471-74 and accompanying text supra
486. See note 460 supra
487. See notes 477-78 and accompanying text supra
A second and more important effect of the adoption of a divi-
dend credit method of integration by the primary state is a conse-
quence of the fact that the corporation has no tax liability to the
primary state.488 The dividend, therefore, is included in the primary
state income of the shareholders as it is under current law, but there
is no state corporate income tax credit for the shareholders to claim
against their income tax liabilities to the primary state. 489 The pri-
mary state adopting the dividend credit method of integration must
rely on the secondary state to provide relief to the corporation in
situations falling within this category.
4. Corporation Resident in Primary and Secondary States And
Its Shareholders Resident in Primary State.-If the dividend credit
method of integration is adopted at the federal level, the effect in this
category is a compounding of two types of issues: the issues arising
when the corporation is resident only in the secondary state and the
issue of allocation and apportionment of corporate income. In most
situations in which the corporation is resident only in the secondary
state and the shareholders are resident in the primary state, little is
added by the fact that the corporation is subject to income taxation
by the primary state. The one exception is that the primary state
adopting the dividend credit method of integration will not face the
problem that arises if the corporation has no inome tax liability to
the primary state. The shareholders will include all or a portion of
the income tax liability of the corporation to the primary state in
their primary state taxable incomes and will be permitted to claim a
credit in that amount against their income tax liabilities to that state.
D. Dividend Deduction
Adoption of a federal dividend deduction method of integration
would present the states with several problems. Regardless of its re-
sponse to the adoption of the dividend deduction method of integra-
tion by the federal government, the primary state will not be
concerned with the response of the secondary state, because the divi-
dend deduction method of integration affects only corporate income
tax.
If the primary state adopts the dividend deduction method of
integration, it must decide whether it should allow the deduction for
dividends paid to nonresident shareholders. 49 Although permitting
488. This is because the fact pattern involves a corporation that is not resident in and,
thus, not subject to taxation by the primary state. See note 178 and accompanying text supra
489. See Letter from James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of
New York, to James E. Maule (January 11, 1978) at 4 (on fie at the Dickinson School of Law).
490. This problem is not unlike that encountered at the federal level regarding whether
nonresident alien shareholders should be eligible for income tax integration. See Comm. on
Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 47-48; Letter from
such a deduction produces a revenue loss because the nonresident
shareholders do not have a tax liability to the primary state, the pro-
ponents of integration point out that double taxation of corporate
earnings would not necessarily be completely eliminated if the de-
duction for those dividends were denied.
49" '
The primary state adopting the dividend deduction method of
integration will also need to provide a method for determining what
portion of the dividends paid by the corporation are allocable to the
primary state.492 Presumably, the deduction should be the same pro-
portion of the dividends as the proportion of corporate taxable in-
come before dividends and state income taxes allocable to the
primary state bears to the entire taxable income of the corporation
before dividends and state income taxes.493 The computation could
be more complex if the state adopts a precise approach by requiring
a tracing of the corporate taxable income from which dividends are
paid494 and applies a separate proportion fraction to the taxable in-
come from each taxable year.495
E. Dividend Exclusion
If a dividend exclusion method of integration is adopted at the
federal level, the states face several issues. Primary states will not be
concerned from a technical standpoint with the response of the sec-
James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of New York, to James E.
Maule (January 11, 1978) at 4 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
491. Proponents of income tax integration have not yet addressed this specific issue in the
state context, but this position is an almost inevitable result of their reasoning. See notes 4-6
and accompanying text supra A constitutional equal protection question might be raised by a
corporation whose shareholders are nonresidents. The state will emphasize that it taxes only
residents' dividends and that therefore its double taxation of corporate earnings, eliminated by
allowing a deduction for dividends distributed to resident shareholders, does not exist for divi-
dends distributed to nonresident shareholders.
492. The issue arises only if the corporation is a resident in the secondary as well as the
primary state. The remainder of a full dividend deduction would be provided by the secon-
dary state since it, and not the primary state, is responsible if double taxation occurs because of
its action or inaction. The federal government, by adopting the dividend deduction method of
integration, has determined that the cause of double taxation is the taxation at the corporate
level of distributed dividends.
The issue is analogous to that at the federal level concerning whether a deduction should
be permitted for dividends paid from tax-exempt income. See McLure, Integration of Personal
and Corporate Income Taxes." The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, supra
note i, at 565.
493. The peculiar nature of the tax law or tax policy of a particular state might require the
use of an income figure from an earlier or later point in the computation of taxable income,
such as taxable income after state income taxes.
494. Special rules similar to those provided for computing earnings and profits would be
required. See note 413 supra.
495. The complexity can be illustrated by considering a corporation that in its first taxable
year does business only in the secondary state, pays no dividends, and has after-tax net income
of $100. In its second taxable year, the corporation does business in both the primary and the
secondary states, has no income from either state, but distributes a $50 dividend to its share-
holders. The issue is whether the primary state should allow a dividend deduction in that
situation.
ondary state because the dividend exclusion method of integration
affects only individual income tax. This is not changed by either
adoption or rejection of a dividend exclusion method of integration.
From a policy standpoint, however, the primary state must be con-
cerned with the response of the secondary state. If the secondary
state does not provide the exclusion for its residents who are share-
holders in a primary state corporation,496 the goals of the primary
state are thwarted to that extent.497
A technical issue that arises regarding the dividend exclusion
method of integration is whether the primary state should permit the
exclusion of dividends attributable to income not taxed by the pri-
mary state. The adoption of such a rule would require complex rules
of attribution and special provisions for dividends paid in a year
other than that in which earned.498 The primary state does not bene-
fit, however, from adopting complex attribution rules that provide,
in effect, for a partial dividend exclusion. If the secondary state
taxes resident shareholders of the primary state on the portion of the
dividend attributable to corporate earnings from the secondary state,
which it is not likely to do,49 9 the primary state would permit its
resident shareholders to claim an income tax credit for those taxes.
Since the net effect of the credit is to remove that portion of the divi-
dend from primary state taxable income, a partial denial of the ex-
clusion would be counterproductive. Similarly, if the secondary
state does not tax the resident shareholder of the primary state on the
portion of the dividend attributable to corporate earnings from the
secondary state, the primary state, by excluding that portion from
the dividend exclusion, continues to impose double taxation on cer-
tain corporate income.
If the primary state has no individual income tax, it has no
problems because it has a dividend exclusion method of integra-
tion"°° already in effect.5"'
496. Even if the secondary state rejects integration, it will continue, as it does under pres-
ent law, to not tax primary state residents on dividends whether or not the corporation is
subject to income taxation by the secondary state. A constitutional equal protection question
could be raised by the nonresident corporation whose shareholders resident in the secondary
state are not permitted to exclude dividends received from the corporation-if the corporation
has standing to raise the issue-but the secondary state can reply as it would to the question
raised by the dividend deduction method of integration. See note 491 SUpra.
497. The primary state cannot provide a credit to the shareholders who are residents of the
secondary state because those shareholders are not subject to income taxation by the primary
state.
498. See notes 494-95 and accompanying text supra.
499. States generally do not tax dividends received by nonresident shareholders. See note
400 and accompanying text supra. Thus, the primary state resident would not be taxed by the
secondary state.
500. The word "exclusion" is misleading because there is no individual gross income from
which the dividend can be excluded.
501. The state that has no individual income tax will not encounter the partial dividend
F. Split Corporate Tax Rates and Repeal of the Corporate Income
Tax
If a split rate method of integration is adopted at the federal
level or if the federal corporate income tax is repealed, the states will
encounter no problems in the context of the federal relationship
among the states. Both methods of integration affect only the corpo-
rate income tax. The only open issues are whether the state will ad-
just its corporate income tax in response to a split rate method at the
federal level, and whether the state will repeal its corporate income
tax5°u in response to repeal of the federal corporate income tax.
VII. Maintenance of State Revenues and Administrative
Simplicity in A Federal System
A. Introduction
It is possible that various states may be satisfied with the imme-
diate effects on state income taxation if the federal government
adopts income tax integration." 3 It is also possible that a state may
be content to adopt or reject integration. A state could decide that to
follow any of the three courses of action-no response, adoption of
integration, or rejection of integration-would be disastrous or ex-
tremely burdensome to the state .50 Thus, the state might seek alter-
native courses of action. Some of the proposed alternative
arrangements are feasible only if many states agree to pursue them.
These arrangements are not mutually exclusive and assorted combi-
nations of their features provide additional possible arrangements.
Finally, other arrangements exist that have not occurred to the au-
thor and which will be suggested only when other writers address
them.
B. Federal Revenue Adjustments
The federal revenue sharing mechanism provides a method of
offsetting revenue shifts that will occur as a consequence of the adop-
exclusion problem discussed in the text accompanying note 498 supra because its decision not
to tax any dividends already has been made.
502. See note 379 supra
503. This article speaks in terms of actions, decisions, and analyses by the state for reasons
of simplicity. More precisely, it is the legislature, Governor, and citizenry of a state that de-
cide, act, and analyze.
504. A state should consider that if federal income tax integration is as successful as its
proponents predict it will be, the benefits to the national economy caused by federal income
tax integration should filter through to the states in the form of increased tax bases-such as
higher incomes, more transactions subject to sales taxes, and increases in property tax assess-
ments,-without as great an increase in state expenditures. It is beyond the scope of this article
to measure that effect.
tion of income tax integration at the federal level.5"5 Adjustments in
distribution formulas can be made to compensate states in which
revenues decline. The same purpose can be achieved outside of the
federal revenue sharing mechanism, but requires diversion of some
funds from revenue sharing to the other mechanism. Use of revenue
sharing, however, would avoid creation of another bureaucracy to
handle federal-state fiscal relations. The system used in West Ger-
many to equalize the financial strengths of the states offers guidance
for the designers of a federal adjustment system. Modifications to
the West German equalization system would be necessary because
the fiscal relationships and allocations of tax jurisdiction among the
national and state governments in West Germany differ from those
in the United States. 5° 6
C The Carter Commission Proposals
1 State Withdrawal From the Corporate Income Tax.-When
the Carter Commission in Canada addressed itself to the problems
the provinces would encounter if income tax integration were
adopted at the federal level, it suggested that those problems could
be alleviated if the provinces repealed their corporate income taxes.
The Carter Commission suggested that the states could recoup their
revenue losses5"7 in other ways, 08 but it is not clear that any of the
forty-six states with corporate income taxes would be willing to
abandon the corporate income tax base. Aside from the fact that
state revenues would be jeopardized,509 this arrangement would
leave unresolved many of the problems concerning the individual
income tax that are raised by integration. Presumably, states would
also forego taxing dividends. Even though that arrangement would
solve many administrative problems, states probably would react in
opposition, as did the provinces of Canada.
2. Piggybacking.-Another arrangement proposed by the
Carter Commission to alleviate the problems that the provinces
would encounter is federal collection of income taxes on behalf of
the provinces. This piggybacking approach appears to solve most of
the administrative problems and revenue shifts caused by the adop-
tion of integration at the federal level. Some states, however, have
505. No revenue shifts will occur if every state takes steps to reject income tax integration,
a highly unlikely possibility.
506. See notes 172-74 and accompanying text supra.
507. The revenue loss would be shifted to the federal level.
508. Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Report 196 (Ottawa 1966).
509. Currently, the federal government does not administer any tax that produces as much
revenue as the state corporate income tax and that the federal government is willing to forego
in favor of the states.
constitutional limitations5 1 and problems in computing the share of
each state in the revenue collected by the federal government would
persist. If the piggybacking provisions in the Internal Revnue Code
were used, it would be necessary for each state to adopt integration
and the problems involving taxation of nonresident shareholders and
computing tax credits would remain.5 ' The prospects for this ar-
rangement seem dim, since the states have been reluctant to utilize
the existing piggybacking provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.512
3. Federal Credit for State Corporate Tax.-As a third ar-
rangement for alleviating the problems the provinces would encoun-
ter if income tax integration were adopted at the federal level, the
Carter Commission suggested that the national government should
adopt a dividend credit method of integration that permits share-
holders to claim a credit against their federal tax liabilities for a stan-
dard rate of state income taxes paid by the corporation on the
income from which dividends are paid. This arrangement permits
the states to reject integration and avoid the revenue shifts and ad-
ministrative problems posed by integration, but does not allow them
to thwart federal efforts to decrease or eliminate the double taxation
of corporate income distributed as dividends. The drawback posed
by this arrangement is that it decreases federal revenues without af-
fecting the state income taxes that account for double taxation of
corporate income at the state level. The federal government could
recoup the revenue by eliminating revenue sharing, but the benefits
of the revenue sharing redistribution would flow to corporate share-
holders and not the public at large. States probably would hesitate
to approve such a step.
D. Multistate Tax Compact Amendments
The Multistate Tax Compact provides an opportunity for states
to solve some of the problems that arise when income tax integration
is considered in the context of the federal relationship among the
states. At present, the Multistate Tax Compact is a model act that
has been adopted in whole or in part by at least thirty states to elimi-
nate some of the problems involved with the taxation of the multi-
state taxpayer. The problems of the nonresident shareholder or
nonresident corporation reviewed in this article could be analyzed
and studied with the expectation that a solution could be reached by
a series of additional articles to the Compact. The possibility of
510. See note 181 supra
511. See notes 369-502 and accompanying text supra
512. See NATA REPORT, supra note 231.
resorting to the Multistate Tax Compact to solve the problems of
reacting to income tax integration is doubtful. Most commentators
agree that the Multistate Tax Compact is not the best device for solv-
ing interstate problems.513 Amendments to the Compact are almost
impossible because legislative action by each state is necessary.
514
Amendments to the Multistate Tax Compact deserve attention by
the states when integration is adopted at the federal level, but it is
unlikely that use of the Compact will be considered an adequate
arrangement.
E. Reciprocal Agreements
States may consider the reciprocal agreement to eliminate some
of the interstate complexities of income tax integration. Presently, a
number of states have entered into reciprocal agreements with one,
two, or even a dozen other states in an effort to simplify tax adminis-
tration, both for the state and the taxpayer.5"5 Most of these agree-
ments concern wages, salaries, and similar income earned by a
resident of one of the states from sources within the second state.
51 6
Generally, the agreement permits one state to exempt certain nonres-
ident wages from its income tax if the home state of those nonresi-
dents exempts wages of residents of the first state from its income
tax. This arrangement eliminates withholding and tax credit
problems. It would be advantageous in many situations for states to
enter similar agreements with respect to dividends.
The reciprocal agreement approach has three drawbacks. First,
each state must enter a separate agreement with every other state.
This drawback, however, has not deterred states that have entered
into a number of agreements, albeit with neighboring states.51 7 Sec-
ond, states standing to lose revenue by not taxing nonresident share-
holders on their distributive shares or distributions of net income of
a resident corporation are not apt to welcome a reciprocal agreement
unless it is with a state having similar revenue loss expectations. Fi-
nally, the computation of exempt dividends under a reciprocal
agreement would be more complex than the computation of exempt
wages. Wage records are usually straightforward and if an employee
performs services in two states, the employer must keep separate
513. See 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND FINANCE 663
(1974).
514. Id
515. See, e.g., OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.05(A)(3) (Page 1973).
516. Id See, eg., the Ohio Reciprocal Agreements with Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, dated Jan. 12, 1972, Jan. 7, 1972, Jan. 13, 1972, Dec. 29,
1972, and Jan. 20, 1972, reproduced in 1 OHIo STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 15-215.40, 15-215.90.
517. This would occur if Ohio entered into five reciprocal agreements with neighboring
states. See note 516 supra.
records in any event.518 At present, however, similar records con-
cerning dividends and the sources of the income out of which they
are paid are not as readily available. In the absence of a reciprocal
agreement the complicated dividend records probably will be re-




A state that is concerned about the revenue loss caused by those
methods of income tax integration that eliminate or curtail the cor-
porate income tax might explore possible increases in the use of user
charges. User charges are service fees charged by a state for provid-
ing services to an individual, corporation, or other entity. Since user
charges can be imposed on nonresidents, use of this approach re-
solves most of the problems concerning the effect of income tax inte-
gration on the source of income tax revenues that provide state
services.52°
G. Devices to Administer Taxation of Nonresident Shareholders
The manner in which some of the states subject the nonresident
shareholders of Subchapter S corporations to income taxation sug-
gests certain arrangements that the states might employ to combat
administrative difficulties posed by income tax integration. In Geor-
gia5 2 1 and Kansas,522 a Subchapter S corporation is taxed on the por-
tion of its income attributable to nonresident shareholders unless
those shareholders agree to pay income tax to the state on their dis-
tributive shares of the corporate income. In Idaho
523 and Indiana,5 24
nonresident shareholders are required to pay tax to Idaho or Indiana
518. An employer would have to keep separate records for purposes of state unemploy-
ment insurance tax and the payroll factor in the three-factor income tax apportionment
formula.
519. The reciprocal agreement would not be required for all methods of integration, but
would be most beneficial for full integration and the dividend credit method of integration.
520. See notes 342-48 and accompanying text supra A discussion of user charges is be-
yond the scope of this article, but the opportunity they present for solving some of the
problems caused by integration deserves mention. For excellent explanations and analyses of
user charges, see PUBLIC PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS (S. Mushkin ed. 1972); Goetz, The
Revenue Potential of User-Related Charges in State and Local Governments, in BROAD-BASED
TAXES: NEW Or1IONS AND SOURCES (R.A. Musgrave ed. 1973); Kafoglis, Local Services
Charges: Theory and Practice, in STATE AND LOCAL TAx PROBLEMS 164 (H.L. Johnson ed.
1969); Stockfish, Fees and Service Charges As a Source of City Revenues: A Care Study of Los
Angeles, 13 NAT'L TAX J. 97 (1960).
A device similar to the user charge is the special district. See Mitchell, The Use of Special
Districts in Financing and Facilitating Urban Growth, 5 URB. LAW. 185 (1973); Novak, A Model
SpecialAssessment Law, 1 Gov'T FINANCE 8 (1972).
521. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3102(b)(ii) (Supp. 1977).
522. KAN. STAT. § 79-32,139 (1969).
523. IDAHo TAX REo. § 22(d)(2), IDAHO STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 13-076.
524. See Circular IT-18, 1 IND. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 116-016.
on their distributive shares of the corporate net income. In Idaho,
however, if the nonresident shareholders do not pay the tax, the Sub-
chapter S corporation is taxable on the income attributable to those
shareholders. 25 Indiana requires the Subchapter S corporation 526 to
withhold income tax on distributions that it makes to nonresident
shareholders. 2 The Indiana withholding provision resolves the ad-
ministrative issue of compliance by nonresidents, but the problems
of computing the amount of corporate income for which the nonresi-
dent shareholder is liable528 remain unresolved. Interestingly, some
states-Iowa, 529 Missouri, 530 and Virginia 53 '-require nonresident
shareholders of Subchapter S corporations to pay income tax on
their distributive shares of the corporate net income and apparently
have no more difficulty with this tax administration than they do
with nonresident partners.532
VIII. Conclusion
The adoption of income tax integration 533 at the federal level
will produce significant consequences for state income tax systems.
Revenue shifts and administrative difficulties are an inevitable result
whether a particular state ignores, adopts, or rejects the federal gov-
ernment's choice of a system of integration.5 34 A state may decide to
negate the effects of federal integration on the state tax system or,
alternatively, it may determine that the wiser option is to conform to
the federal scheme. Steps can be outlined and implemented to pur-
sue either goal. Regardless of the path taken, difficulties will cer-
tainly arise since not all fifty states will react harmoniously. The
states have demonstrated, however, that they are able to cope with
tax law revision at the federal level.5 3  The adoption of integration
may be the supreme test of the states' flexibility, but the problems to
be faced are not insurmountable. A probing examination of the var-
525. IDAHO TAX REo. § 22(d)(3), IDAHO STAi TAX REP. (CCH) 13-076.
526. Indiana also imposes this requirement on other corporations that are exempt from
income tax because the corporate net income is included in the state taxable income of the
shareholders.
527. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3-4-13 (Burns Code Ed. Supp. 1977).
528. See notes 369-502 and accompanying text supra.
529. IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.36(5) (1971).
530. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.181(5) (Vernon 1976).
531. VA. CODE § 58-151.013(f)0(3) (Supp. 1977).
532. A tax administrator in any of those states probably would point out that it is more
difficult to subject nonresidents than residents to compliance and enforcement. See McKessy,
supra note 7, at 378.
533. This particular conclusion does not apply to the split-rate method of integration.
534. These revenue shifts and administrative difficulties for the most part will not arise for
states that have no income taxes and states whose corporate and individual income tax systems
do not conform to the federal income tax base. See note 176 supra. On December 16, 1980,
only eleven states were in these categories. 41 STATE TAX REv. (CCH) No. 51, at 4-7 (Decem-
ber 16, 1980).
535. See notes 90-132, 521-32 and accompanying text supra.
ious responses and complex arrangements that are available will set
the groundwork for state legislators and tax administrators to de-
velop and implement solutions when the time arrives.
APPENDIX I
Illustration (i) Average corporate tax rate exceeds
average individual tax rate
a. Prior to full integration
1. Corporation income before taxes
2. State tax (4%)
3. Federal taxable income
4. Federal tax (48%)
5. Available for dividends
6. Dividends
7. Shareholder income
8. State tax (2 %)
9. Total state tax (lines 2 & 8)
b. Immediate effect of full integration
I. Corporate income before taxes
2. State and federal tax
3. Shareholder distributive share
4. State tax (2 %)
c. Decrease in state tax revenue as immediate
effect of full integration (line a9 minus line
4)
Illustration (2) Average individual tax exceeds
average corporate tax rate
a. Prior to full integration
I. Corporation income before taxes
2. State tax (2%)
3. Federal taxable income
4. Federal tax (48%)
5. Available for dividends
6. Dividends
7. Shareholder income
8. State tax (4%)
9. Total state tax (lines 2 & 8)
b. Immediate effect of full integration
I. Corporation income before taxes
2. State and federal tax
3. Shareholder distributive share
4. State tax (4%)
c. Increase (decrease) in state tax revenue as
immediate effect of full integration (line 4
































20.00 11.85 ( .38)
APPENDIX II
a. Prior to dividend credit method of integra-
tion
1. Corporation income before taxes
2. State tax (4%)
3. Federal taxable income
4. Federal tax (48%)




9. Total state tax (lines 2 & 8)
b. Immediate effect of dividend credit method
of integration
1. Corporation income before taxes
2. State tax (4%)
3. Federal taxable income
4. Federal tax (48%)
5. Available for dividends
6. Dividends
7. Federal tax attributable to dividends
8. Shareholder income
9. State tax (2h%)
10. Total state tax (lines 2 & 9)
c. Increase in state tax revenue as immediate
effect of dividend credit method of integra-
tion (line blO minus line a)
Maxi-
No 40% mum
divi- divi- divi-
dends dends dends
$1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00
40.00 40.00 40.00
960.00 960.00 960.00
460.80 460.80 460.80
499.20 499.20 499.20
-0- 199.68 499.20
-0- 199.68 499.20
-0- 4.99 12.48
40.00 44.99 52.48
1,000.00 1,000.00 1,000.00
40.00 40.00 40.00
960.00 960.00 960.00
460.80 460.80 460.80
499.20 499.20 499.20
-0- 199.68 499.20
-0- 184.32 460.80
-0- 384.00 960.00
-0- 9.60 24.00
40.00 49.60 64.00
-0- 4.61 11.52
